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ABSTRACT 
 
According to the democratic principles of the separation of powers and judicial 
independence, the judiciary has to apply the law and only the law to the facts before 
it. However, this principle is not actually applied in many countries where we witness 
intervention in judicial judgments. While judges adjudicate cases before them and try 
to find legal solutions under the application of law, they may also rely, in some cases, 
on both the letter of the law and the overarching activism directives behind it at the 
same time. Accordingly, a judge legislates according to his own particular 
interpretation of a certain legal provision in a manner that may broaden or narrow its 
scope of application in order to achieve justice from his personal point of view. This 
process of making law is "the judicial activism of judges." Such intervention may 
take place in human rights cases where judges interpret the notions, conceptions, 
definitions, and limitations of freedoms and liberties according to their ideological 
basis; consequently, judicial activism differs from one judge to another. This study 
highlights the existence of judicial activism through reviewing several actual cases 
from the Egyptian State Council. The massive conflicts in State Council 
jurisprudence can be understood in light of judges' distinct education, culture, 
persuasions, experience, environment, and way of thinking. This is the rational 
explanation that may clarify the significant mental differentiations among judges to 
comprehend certain subjects, despite the fact that such subjects are governed by 
specific and fixed legal provisions. 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction 1 
I. Defining Judicial Activism …………………………………………………… 4 
A. The Notion of the Judicial Activism …………………………………… 4 
B. Judicial Activism and Politics ………………………...……………….. 8 
C. Judicial Activism and Judges Discretionary Power ……….…………… 9 
II. Wearing face-veils …………………………………………………………... 11 
A. Proponents for women freedom to wear face-veils …………….………. 12 
1. NohaAmr v. AUC and the Ministry of High Education ………… 12 
2. The Unifying Principle Circuit Opinion ………………………... 14 
3. Mahmoud Samy v. The Ministry of Education and Isis   
Secondary School ………………………………………………………………... 15 
B. Restricting women freedom to wear face-veils in some places with   
Some conditions ………………………………………………………................. 15 
1. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Constitutional Court 
Verdicts ….. 
15 
2. Reham Mostafa v. Ain Shams University …………………........ 18 
C. Comparison and Analysis ……………………………………………… 21 
III. Proof of Religious Conversion in National Identification Cards …………... 25 
A. Proponents of Proofing Religious Conversion in National Identification   
Cards …………………………………………………………………... 25 
B. Opponents of Proofing Religious Conversion in National Identification   
Cards …………………………………………………………………….. 29 
C. Comparison and Analysis ………………………………………………. 32 
IV. Appointment of Visually Impaired Citizens to Diplomatic Service ………… 35 
A. Opponents of Appointing Visually impaired citizens to Diplomatic   
Posts ……………………………………………………………………… 37 
v 
 
B. Proponents of Appointing Visually impaired citizens to Diplomatic  
Posts…………...…………………………………………………………………. 39 
C. The Advisory Opinion of the General Assembly for the advisory and   
Legislation Departments Regarding Visually impaired citizens ………………… 43 
D. Comparison and Analysis ……………………………………………….. 44 
V. Appointment of Women to Public Service …………………………………… 46 
     A. Appointing Women to Public Posts ………………………………………. 46 
          1. Proponents of Women Appointment to Public Posts …………………... 46 
          2. Opponents of Women Appointment to Public Posts …………………… 47 
     B. Appointing Women to Judicial Posts …………………………………. ….. 48 
          1. Proponents for Traditions and Customs notions as Criteria for Women   
Appointment to Judicial Posts …………….……………………………………... 49 
          2. Opponents for Traditions and Customs notions as Criteria for Women 
Appointment to Judicial Posts ………………………………………………….. 
 
 
50 
          3. The Egyptian State Council General Assembly opinion ………………. 52 
C.  Comparison and Analysis ………………………………………………... 52 
Conclusion ………………………………………………………………..…….. 56 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
The Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
recognize the values of the rule of law, such as the equality of all individuals before 
the law, and judicial independence. Such fundamental principles guarantee the 
protection of human rights in both the developing and the developed countries. 
 
In Egypt, successive constitutions have provided for the independence of the 
judiciary, namely the Supreme Constitutional Court, the Ordinary Judiciary, and the 
Administrative Judiciary (The State Council).1 According to the democratic principles 
of the separation of powers and judicial independence, the judiciary applies the 
written rules on the facts before them; they have to apply the law and only the law. 
 
While most countries state the independence of the judiciary in their constitutions, the 
principle is not actually applied in many countries where we witness intervention in 
judicial judgments. In 1985, the Commissioner of the United Nations for Human 
Rights stated the measurement criteria for the independence of the judiciary, such as 
their selection, qualification, training, suspension, and removal.2 
 
However, many scholars argue that judges often go beyond the mere "application" 
into the actual "making" of law. Accordingly, this study focuses of the crucial 
question of legislation in Egypt, and how judges legislate in their judgments under the 
rubric of what I call "judicial activism". 
 
Such an issue is extremely serious as it leads, in many cases, to contradictions among 
legal judgments. The multiplicity of the contradicting judgments in Egyptian society 
because of judicial activism may create what is called a status of uncertainty of the 
legal judgments. Because of the fact that Egyptians are used to respecting the 
 
1 The Egyptian constitutions starting from the 1923 (article 94), till the 2014 constitution (article 184) 
used to provide the independency of the judiciary. 
2Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, Seventh United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, 26 August to 6 September 1985, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (1985). https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/i5bpij.htm. 
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Egyptian judiciary and trust its judgments, the existence of judicial activism may 
actually lead to serious consequences.3 
 
From my judicial experience as a judge in the Egyptian State Council, I want to 
emphasize that the uncertainty of the legal judgments involves many negative 
consequences in terms of both judges and litigants. Lawyers exploit legal uncertainty 
to win in some controversial cases, for example by manipulating the legal system 
through pursuing their lawsuits only before certain judicial circuits that adopt the legal 
viewpoints which comply with their allegations.  
 
Consequently, such a fact negatively affects the credibility of judges in the society, 
and it absolutely leads to contradicting legal decisions. Furthermore, such a status of 
uncertainty regarding legal judgments may lead to a negative feeling of injustice and 
inequality among citizens in Egyptian society.   Moreover, litigants are unable to 
predict the outcome of their cases, which may lead to the loss of confidence in the 
judicial authority. Ultimately, such a conclusion will negatively affect the political 
stability of the state. 
 
In this study, I argue that while judges adjudicate cases before them and try to find 
legal solutions through the application of law, they may also rely, in some cases, on 
both the letter of the law and the overarching activism directives behind it at the same 
time. Accordingly, I call this process of making law "the judicial activism of judges." 
I contend that such judicial activism relates mainly to the judges' thoughts, beliefs, 
conceptions, ideologies, education, environment, and experience;4 consequently, this 
activism differs from one judge to another according to these factors. 
 
This thesis aims to prove the existence of judicial activism by presenting, and 
reviewing several judgments that have been issued by Egyptian State Council judges 
which is the judicial entity that decides mainly thuman rights cases in Egypt in the 
context of Administrative Law. Furthermore, all of the studied judgments are separate 
 
3 Unfortunately, some people strongly thought that legal decisions are like gambling; they cannot guess 
in advance judges' legal conclusions. 
4 I want to emphasize that one or more of these factors absolutely will affect his viewpoints and his 
judgments, such as whether he was born in a rural area or in the city, whether his education involves 
democratic notions or not, or whether he has been exposed to other cultures or not, along with the 
extent of his experience, fields of practice … etc.  
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from religious beliefs. Moreover, I shall not determine a time limit for such study as 
judicial activism exists in both the ancient and the modern judgments. In addition, the 
cases that the study addresses involve both facts and legal rules that, to a very great 
extent, resemble each other; nevertheless we find a massive difference in the legal 
conclusions.  
 
Chapter I of this study details the precise meaning of judicial activism and 
differentiates it from other notions that may resemble it, most notably politics and the 
discretionary power of judges. I provide an overview of the literatures written on the 
issue; some scholars adopt the viewpoint of applying the rules of law, others believe 
in the process of making law by judges. Moreover, the study presents a pragmatic 
study by offering some realistic cases from the Egyptian courts in order to prove the 
existence of judicial activism in these courts.  
 
The ensuing chapters provide detailed applications of different notions of judicial 
activism in various contexts of litigation, namely: the right of women to wear face 
veils in Chapter II, the right of Egyptian citizens to change their religion as indicated 
on the National Identification Cards in Chapter III; the right of citizens with 
disabilities to be appointed to public office as diplomats in Chapter IV; and finally the 
right of female citizens to be appointed to public posts generally and to the judicial 
authority in particular as discussed in Chapter V.   
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I. Defining Judicial Activism 
 
According to the Separation of Powers principle, state authorities work independently; 
every authority has to undertake what is stipulated in the constitution. Consequently, the 
legislative authority has to “make laws,” the executive authority has to “implement” these 
laws, and finally the judiciary has to “settle” disputes only in accordance with the laws. In 
that scheme, the ordinary work of judges is to apply the state enacted laws of the country, 
yet in many cases we find judges making laws that are then applied to the existing 
disputes.  
 
A. The Notion of the Judicial Activism: 
 
In two or more cases we may find similar facts which necessitate the application of the 
same legal provisions, but entirely different conclusions may be reached in each dispute. 
If we legally fix three elements, namely the facts of two cases, the close time period in 
which such facts took place, and the applied laws which govern such facts, we may find 
that, in some cases, the first judge deduces a certain legal conclusion that is totally 
distinct from the second judge's one. This is what is called judicial activism that forms the 
core of this study. 
 
No doubt that the process of making law differs from the process of applying it; 
consequently, the crucial and critical question that arises in this context is about the legal 
meaning of judicial activism in terms of this study. A judge may legislate due to a 
particular interpretation that he gives to a certain law provision from his point of view, 
background, and ideology. This situation can take place in cases of broad or vague law 
provisions, such as human rights ones where fundamental rights are provided by the 
legislator without providing boundaries for such rights, and the judge's role is to 
determine the limitation of the rule's application.  Thus, the judge may interpret a law 
provision in a manner that broadens or narrows its scope of application in order to 
achieve justice from his personal viewpoint. Moreover, the judge may legislate in order to 
overcome the problem of “hard cases” where the applied law runs out in order to fill such 
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gap. This study addresses the former case where the process of judges' interpretations is 
the main reason for their judgments differentiations. 
 
There are two main viewpoints regarding intervention in the judiciary’s work, namely 
adjudication and legislation. Some literature adopts the notion of adjudication; 
accordingly, they think that the sole role of judges is to apply law to the facts and cases 
before them.5The other school of thought believes that it may be absurd to think of the 
judge’s sole role as merely applying the written rules; he may play a bigger role in many 
other cases which necessitates other tools rather than applying the law.6 
 
Liberal law thinkers adopt the Separation of Powers principle; consequently, they think 
that judges are not permitted to make law; "judges should merely act as deputy to 
legislature not as deputy legislators; they should only apply legal principles."7 According 
to such a normative view legislatures should legislate and only legislate, whereas courts 
should adjudicate and only adjudicate: 
 
 There is a massive difference between what can be called questions of law 
and questions of fact. The former falls within the judge’s province because 
they involve objective questions of meaning rather than the subjective 
judgments that are required when we make the political choice to apply 
one rule or another to a given fact situation. Because of the fact that the 
process of making law is political, it should only be done by elected 
officials who operate under the norm of accountability to their constituents. 
8 
 
This point of view asserts that such distinction between legislation and adjudication 
remains sharp even in light of the fact that law application will often require a 
reformulation of the rule before it can be applied to the facts or even in hard cases: 
 
 We are unsure at first brush how to apply the rules to the facts; we resolve 
the question through appealing to the definition of the words. As long as 
 
5Dworkin is a scholar who belongs to such normative school of thought.  
6 Such as Duncan Kennedy and Hale who belong to this modern school of thought. 
7 Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules1, at 28- 32 (Jan 1967), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4614&context=fss_papers. 
8 Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication, Harvard University Press, (1997) at 27 
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the process of reformulation is understood to the ‘semantic’ or ‘deductive’ 
in the sense of looking for the ‘meaning’ of the words that compose the 
rule to be applied, it is not ,in this understanding, rulemaking even if the 
case is hard one.9 
 
Regarding judges' ideological interventions in hard cases, this opinion concludes that “in 
fact legal principles are most conspicuously at play in hard cases, where they guide and 
constraint judicial decision making in the absence of legal rules.”10 
 
 Ultimately, such viewpoint emphasizes the concept of professional judges who are 
responsible for the application of laws: 
Since the determination of questions of right can be done objectively, 
rather than ideologically, it seems obvious that it should be. Therefore it 
should be entrusted to trained professionals operating under a norm of 
‘independent’ fidelity to law.11 
 
On the other hand, another group contends that if judges do apply law at all times, it 
seems equally obvious that judges constantly have to do something more than just 
applying law. Such view alleges that at a minimum, judges often have the job of resolving 
gaps, conflicts, or ambiguities in the system of legal norms. This group argues that "when 
it is said that there is a gap, conflict, or ambiguity in this sense, then it is also agreed that 
the judge who resolves it "makes" a new rule and then he applies it to the facts, rather 
than merely applying the preexisting rule."12 
 
In addition, such a group thinks that judges, especially American ones, deny that they 
make law even in hard cases. Moreover, other writers note that if the function of a court, 
especially in a civil law system, is merely to apply the written law, such statement may be 
curtailed, and it would mean a very narrow judicial function: 
 
When a court applies a law, it has to interpret that law; in the process of 
interpretation the court may well extend the scope of the law considerably 
 
9Id., at 28. 
10 Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide For The Perplexed, Public Law and Legal 
Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.77, March 2007 at 11. 
11Kennedy, Supra note 10 at 28. 
12 Kennedy, Supra note 10 at 28.  
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beyond that originally contemplated. By this method of interpretation and 
by filling in gaps where the written law is silent or insufficient, the civil 
law court can be considered as ‘making’ law interstitially.13 
 
In addition, they assert that a judge makes law when he adheres to and respects 
precedents that were decided by other courts or even by him previously; accordingly, they 
become “jurisprudence constante.”14 
 
Moreover, positivist thinkers, such as Hale who constitutes a distinct school of law, 
believes that the law in a certain society is the sum of special rules used and agreed upon 
by the community15 directly or indirectly for the purpose of determining which behavior 
will be punished or coerced by the public power.16 Such rules have to be adopted by 
political institutions, such as the legislature or the judiciary. Because of this, positivists 
entitle judges with discretionary power in hard cases which may take place under two 
conditions. The first is where law is unclear or two rules contradict with each other. The 
second is where the law is clear but leads to absurdity: 
 
If someone’s case is not clearly covered by such a rule because there is 
none that seem appropriate, or those that seem appropriate are vague, or for 
some other reasons then that case cannot be decided by ‘applying the law.’ 
It must be decided by some official, like a judge, "exercising his 
discretion.17 
 
B. Judicial Activism and Politics:  
 
This study distinguishes between working and engaging in political matters by judges 
which is called in the context of this study "politics" on the one side and "judicial 
activism" which means the personal interpretation of the legal provisions by judges on the 
other one. Accordingly, judges do not and should not engage in ordinary politics which 
 
13 Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 426. 
14 Id., at 427. 
15 Neil MacCormick, The Concept of Law and 'The Concept of Law', 14, No. 1. Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 17 (1994). 
16Dworkin, supra note 9 at 17. 
17Dworkin, supra note 9 at 17. 
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relates, in the context of this study, to the competence of both the legislative and 
executive authorities. 
 
Despite the fact that judges enjoy the same political rights as ordinary citizens as stated 
by the law, and they are affected by the political events that take place around them, they 
are prohibited from reflecting their political opinions and viewpoints in their legal 
judgments.18 Moreover, they cannot join any political party to engage in politics.19 
Consequently, judges' engagements in politics may take the form of supporting certain 
political ideas, or joining a certain political party and adopting its political viewpoints that 
may be in favor or against the state's political strategy.20 Thus, political notions included 
in judges' legal verdicts lead to politicized verdicts which are prohibited by law. 
Accordingly, a judge's political idea that is not encompassed in his judgment may not 
form an engagement in politics, such as his personal political viewpoints regarding a 
certain political party.21 Accordingly, we can say that judges' engagements in politics are 
seen in the intentional ideas or acts that they incorporate into their judgments. Politicized 
judges want to reflect their own political ideas in their judgments in order to support or 
defeat a certain group or notion.22 
 
On the other hand, the idea of "judicial activism" is totally different from the notion of 
"politics". This is because the process of adjudicating a certain case takes several steps, 
namely the judge's comprehension of the disputed facts, the interpretation of the 
 
18Seethe law of organizing the practice of political rights no. 73 for the year of 1956 and its amendments; 
Judges have the right to vote in elections and referendums as ordinary people as stipulated in. 
19See article 73 of the judicial authority law and article 95 of the State Council law. Both of them clearly 
states that “Judges are prohibited to practice and engage in politics.” 
20 See the Egyptian Court of Cassation judgment no.34 issued in 14/3/1955; it decided that “if the judge 
expressed his opinion regarding a certain case before issuing his written decision in this case, such a 
decision in such case shall be void.” 
21 It is worth mention that judges are not prohibited from disclosing their political viewpoints as long as 
such viewpoints are apart from the cases they are deciding. Judges are ordinary people who live in the 
society; consequently, they are influenced by political events that take place around them. In other words, 
judges are only prohibited from engaging into politics, such as joining political parties. 
22 After the Egyptian revolution, a judicial stream named "Kodah men AglMasr" appeared in the Media 
advocating a certain political group in public. Such judges were violating laws and they were dismissed 
from the Egyptian judiciary by the final legal decision of the Supreme Disciplinary Council. For more 
details see: 
Mohamed Sameh, Egypt's Supreme Disciplinary Council removes 32 judges from their posts, Albawaba 
EG, March 28, 2016. available at: http://www.albawabaeg.com/83412 
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concerned and competent rule of law, and finally the application of these rules to these 
facts. Judicial activism relates mainly to the second element, namely the interpretation of 
law. Such a process is a purely mental activity which depends fundamentally on the way a 
judge comprehends such a rule of law. Such comprehension differs from one judge to 
another according to individual education, personal thoughts, and ideologies; this is what 
is called judicial activism. Consequently, judicial activism is the intangible personal ideas 
and principles which judges may include in their decisions unintentionally.  
 
C. Judicial Activism and Judges Discretionary Power: 
 
The notion of judicial activism is entirely different from the conception of judges' 
discretionary power. Such power is granted to judges by the legislature in order to 
achieve justice. Consequently, this power is conferred mainly to the criminal law judge in 
order to augment or lessen the criminal's punishment according to some factual and legal 
factors that he assesses in the cases before him. As a result, such power is recognized by 
both the legislature and the judges and it is used by judges intentionally.23 Moreover, such 
power is granted to the criminal law judge in almost all of the criminal cases that s/he 
adjudicates, whereas judicial activism takes place in some cases that relate mainly to the 
fundamental human rights of citizens in the society. 
 
I think that the Egyptian legislator recognizes the existence of the judicial activism in the 
Administrative judiciary. Consequently, the legislator has created a certain circuit in the 
Supreme Administrative Court "The Unifying Principles Circuit"24 in order to unify the 
contradicting administrative judgments in Egypt. In fact, some judges prefer to decide 
controversial cases, in spite of knowing that these cases have to be reviewed first by the 
Unifying Circuit; thus, they do not present such cases to this circuit. Accordingly, some 
conflicting judgments, unfortunately, are not legally revised by such circuit in order to 
resolve the conflict between them. Moreover, other judges do not comply with the 
 
23 It is worth mentioning that many judges don't know anything about the judicial activism; they use such 
activism in their judgments without knowing that they are intervening in some way by their personal 
viewpoints in their judgments. On the other hand we may find other judges who deny such truth entirely. 
24 The original reads:  ةلودلا سلجمب ايلعلا ةيرادلاا ةمكحملاب ئدابملا ديحوت ةرئاد 
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decisions that are issued from this legal circuit. This study addresses mainly the Egyptian 
judges in order to argue and prove that, in some cases, judges actually intervene with their 
personal opinions in their judgments.25 Consequently, judges have to present every 
controversial and contradicting issue to the Unifying Circuit in order to unify the diverse 
viewpoints. In addition, they have to respect, apply, adhere to, and comply with such 
circuit legal decisions in order to avoid or even reduce the notion of contradicting 
judgments in Egypt.            
 
 
25 Unfortunately, many judges do not recognize what may be called judicial activism, namely the 
unintentional subjective intervention in cases. They think that such variation in the judicial decisions may 
occur because of mere legal viewpoints.  
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II. Wearing face-veils 
 
As previously discussed State Council judges, while adjudicating cases before them, may 
depend on many other factors besides the pure application of law. Judges' ideologies, 
culture, beliefs, and social backgrounds may strongly affect their verdicts. This is what is 
called "judicial activism." Such intervention may take place in some human rights cases 
where courts interpret the notions, conceptions, definitions, limitations, and parameters of 
freedoms and liberties according to their ideological basis.  
 
One of these freedoms that has been socially debated both by ordinary people and in 
courts is the issue of wearing women's face veil especially in public places, such as public 
institutions, universities, schools, judicial and military clubs. Despite the fact that such an 
issue may seem to reflect a religious debate, it is a social one and based on social 
convention.26 This is because it is religiously recognized that wearing a veil is optional; 
consequently, it is neither mandatory nor forbidden.27 In addition, such an issue relates to 
the basic human rights of people; consequently, it is governed by provisions that relate to 
personal freedom, freedom of belief, freedom of practicing religious rites, and equality.28 
 
The Egyptian administrative judiciary has adopted two main approaches regarding the 
wearing of face veils. The first permits the wearing of veils, whereas the seconddoes not 
 
26 It has been stated in many verdicts of the Supreme administrative court that wearing veil is a mere social 
habit, as I will show later in this chapter. 
27 Such fact shall be illustrated in the chapter. 
28 Article 54 of the Egyptian constitution amended 2014 provides that "Personal freedom is a natural right, 
shall be protected and may not be infringed upon." The original reads:  لا ةنوصم يهو يعيبط قح ةيصخشلا ةيرحلا
مت.س  
In addition, article 57 of the constitution states that "The right to privacy may not be violated, shall be 
protected and may not be infringed upon." The original reads:  سمت لا ةنوصم يهو ةمرح ةصاخلا ةايحلل 
Furthermore, article 64 provides that "Freedom of belief is absolute. The freedom of practicing religious 
rituals and establishing worship places for the followers of Abrahamic religions is a right regulated by 
Law." 
The original reads:  همظني قح ،ةيوامسلا نايدلأا باحصلأ ةدابعلا رود ةماقإو ةينيدلا رئاعشلا ةسرامم ةيرحو .ةقلطم داقتعلاا ةيرح
نوناقلا. 
Moreover, article 65 states that "Freedom of thought and opinion is guaranteed. Every person shall have the 
right to express his/her opinion verbally, in writing, through imagery, or by any other means of expression 
and publication." The original reads:  وأ ،ةباتكلاب وأ ،لوقلاب هيأر نعريبعتلا قح ناسنإ لكلو .ةلوفكم ىأرلاو ركفلا ةيرح
رشنلاو ريبعتلا لئاسو نم كلذ ريغ وأ ،ريوصتلاب. 
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recognize such a perspective. Despite the fact that both parties relied on the same legal 
provisions that govern such a dispute, each one depends on separate arguments to reach 
the final conclusions. We can even find that inside the same body that has reached the 
same conclusion, each court has adopted specific reasons for rationalizing its final 
outcome; such justifications may dramatically differ from one court to another according 
to judges' beliefs and ideologies.  
 
I shall demonstrate these two different judicial perspectives through examining four 
Egyptian veil cases that have been reviewed by the State Council and the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. I will begin with the branch that adopted the freedom of women to 
wear veils, then with the opposite one which restricted such freedom. Furthermore, I will 
not follow a chronological order; rather I will compare different judgments with each 
other to highlight the notion of policy in each one.29 
 
A. Proponents for women freedom to wear face-veils: 
 
There are many verdicts that emphasize the personal freedom of women to wear face 
veils in any place with some conditions, such as revealing their faces to other women for 
identity caution and security purposes. Courts have adopted different and distinct 
approaches in order to justify their conclusions. I shall discuss four court judgments that 
underline such freedom; however, they handled it from different perspectives according 
to the ideologies and beliefs of each court. 
 
1. NohaAmr v. AUC and the Ministry of High Education30: 
The first case NohaAmr v. AUC reflects the judicial viewpoint that supports the freedom 
of women to wear face veils.31 
 
29 There is no need to follow a certain chronological order because I will not talk about political eras, rather 
I shall focus on different trends of the judiciary that may take place in even one year in order to prove that 
the different ideologies of judges are the reason for the differentiation in their legal verdicts not the time 
factor.  
30NohaAmr v. AUC, 241 (2001). 
31 The plaintiff in this case (Noha) filed the law suit number 10566 for the judicial year 55 before the 
Administrative Judicial Court. 
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The plaintiff was an assistant professor in the faculty of translation and languages at 
AlAzhar University who was preparing for her Ph.D. degree. She used to benefit from the 
resources of the AUC library from 1988 during her Masters and her Ph.D. studies.  
In 2001 the board of the faculties' deans at AUC decided that "for security reasons, it has 
been decided to ban wearing face-veil inside classes, laboratories, and libraries of the 
AUC."32 Following this action, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against AUC to void such a 
decision. She argued that the decision infringes on the freedoms and liberties that are 
guaranteed by the Egyptian constitution and laws. The court decided to overrule the AUC 
decision that banned the face-veil on its campus on the basis that wearing veils is 
permitted in Islam on an optional basis.33 In addition, the court emphasized that such 
wearing is not criminalized in Egyptian law, and cannot be considered as immoderation in 
trend because it is socially recognized in Egyptian society. The court added that the sole 
entity that can prohibit the face-veil is the parliament; consequently, the administrative 
authority (the university) cannot issue such decisions as they are outside their legitimate 
authorities:  
 
Wearing face-veil is not prohibited in the Islamic faith. For the veil 
remains one of the personal freedoms that reflect freedom of belief, 
and thus it cannot be totally restricted or banned on women even if 
such ban is in a specific area or place where she has the right to be in. 
Such a total ban, if it exists, represents an infringement upon 
personal freedom on wearing any garment and hence it is a 
restriction on freedom of belief. Wearing face-veil does not violate 
religion or customs as it reflects respectable garments for women that 
protect them. The legislative authority is the sole power that has the 
authority to completely ban face-veils in universities not the 
university or faculty boards.34 
 
32NohaAmr v. AUC, supra note30, at 243. 
33 This legal verdict was issued on 2/12/2001 by the Administrative Judicial Court in case no 10566 for the 
judicial year 55. 
34
NohaAmr v. AUC, supra note30, at 243. The original reads: ابجاو نكي مل نإ اههجو ىلع رامخلا وأ باقنلا ةأرملا لادسا
 هنإف ىأر ىف ايعرش ةيصخشلا ةيرحلا رامغ ىف اقيلط باقنلا لظيو فرعلا هركني لا امك نوناقلا همرجي لاو اعرش روظحمب سيل رخآ ىأر ىف
 ددوحم ناوكم وأ ةونيعم ةوهج ىوف وولو ةأرملا ىلع ةيلك ةروصب هعنم وأ ةقلطم ةفصب هرظح زوجي لا مث نمو ةيديقعلا ةيرحلا فنك ىف اررحمو
 هلثمي امل هدايترا اهل قحي امم ةويديقعلا ةويرحلل دييقت نمو سبلاملا ءادترا ىف ةيصخشلا ةيرحلاب ساسم نم ىلكلا عووونملا وأ قلطملا رظحلا اذه
  اروهظمو هتبحاوصل اويفاو افيرعت لب فرعب مادطصا وأ نوناق عم رفانت نود ةصخر ىذ رخآ نع اضارعإ وأ ةميزع ىذ بهذم ىلع لاابقإ ولو
 قلخلل ايعاد  ازمرو ةمشحلاب ايرغم اويأ باوجحلاب فوفخ روخآ ىلإ نكترت ملو باقنلاب ددش بهذمب اهسفن تذخأ ةأرما ىلع حانج لاف ةماع ميوقلا
  اوطن ىوف اذوه هوقحب ةووسأ تاداوبعلا ىف لخدأ ةلأسم ىف رخآ ىلع ىعرش بهذمل راصتنلاا ىف روتسدلل ىعضولا عرشملا قح ىف ىأرلا ناك
شب قيبطتلل اديحوتو اهيف فلاخلل اعفر تلاماعملا ىوف ةيلو وسملا ىولع نيمئاوقلا نوم ناوك وولو ةيعيروشتلا ةطلوسلا رويغل  وبثي لا قحلا اذهف اهنأ
يلكلا وأ ةعماجلا ىف باقنلل ماتلا عنملاو قلطملا رظحلا كلذ ضرف مهيلأ زوجي لاف تايلكلا ءادمع وأ اهسيئر وأ ةعماجلا سلجم لثم اهريغ. ة  
 
14 
 
 
 
 
2. The Unifying Principle Circuit Opinion:35 
 
AUC appealed the verdict before the Supreme Administrative Court under appeal number 
3219 for the judicial year 48. The appellant alleged that such a verdict infringed previous 
verdicts which were issued by the same court in other cases. Because of the fact that the 
Supreme Administrative Court found itself before more than one conflicted judicial 
approach regarding the wearing of veils, it decided to forward the dispute to the Unifying 
Principles Circuit.36 The Unifying Principles Circuit supported the first degree court's 
judgment; however, it handled it from a different perspective. The court decided that the 
complete ban of the face-veil even in a specific place for a specific period of time violates 
the personal freedom of women. Furthermore, such a prohibition infringes the equality 
principle which is stated in the constitution:  
If women have the full right to wear whatever garments they wish 
without any restrictions from anyone because of the personal 
freedom constitutional principle, Muslim women should also have 
the same right to wear whatever garments they believe in to save 
their modesty and respectability. Accordingly, there should not be 
any unconstitutional, illegitimate, and unjustified distinction between 
these two kinds of women.37 
 
Moreover, the court argued that AUC did not prove its allegations regarding the existence 
of security considerations because of the wear of face veils. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that the sole reason for preventing the student from entering the AUC was the 
wearing of face veil.38 
 
35 AUC v. NohaAmr 250 (2007). 
36 The Unifying Principle Circuit is one of the Supreme Administrative court's circuits. Its role is to unify 
the conflicted approaches and judgments that are issued by this court's circuits.  
37 AUC v. NohaAmr, supra note35, at 251. The original reads: 
نم نيبي هنإ ثيح نمو  املو ، ةماعلا تايرحلا و  وقحلا ىلعو ةيصخشلا ةيرحلا ىلع ةيامحلا نم  اجايس ىفضأ ىروتسدلا عرشملا نأ كلذ
 م  ارظح هئادترا رظح ىرخأ ةهج ىأ وأ ةرادلإا ةهجل زوجي لا هنإف ةيرحلا هذه رهاظم دحأ وه ةملسملا ةأرملل ةبسنلاب باقنلا ءادترا ناك .  اقلط
مومع ةأرملل كرتي امكف ، ةيصخشلا ةيرحلا ىلع  لاوزن ماووشتحلاا طباوووضب كلذ ىف ةدوويقم ريغ بايثلا نم ءاشت ام ىدترت نأ ىف ةيرحلا  ا
 نيب  ةرربم  ريغ  ةقرفت  ةمث  نوكت  لاأو  ،  اهراقوو  اهماشتحا  ىلع  ةظفاحملا  هيف  ىرت  ىذلا  ىزلا  يدترت  نأ  ةملسملا  ةأرملل  كلذك  قحي  هنإف
قلا نم اهل دنس لا نيتفئاطلا . روتسدلا وأ نونا  
38
 AUC v. NohaAmr, supra note35, at 251. The original reads:  ببوس دوووووجو ىولع ليلد يأ ةنعاطلا ةعماجلا مدقت مل ذاو
نملأاب للاخلإا رهاظم نم رهظم يأ دوجو نم  امامت لثاملا نعطلا  اروأ  بدجأ امك ، باقنلا ءادترا نم اهدض نوعطملا عنم ىلإ وعدي ينمأ 
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3. Mahmoud Samy v. The Ministry of Education and Isis 
Secondary School:39 
 
Whereas the first degree court regarding this case supported the notion of women freedom 
to wear face-veils as in the previous case ofNohaAmr v. AUC, the second degree one, 
beside the Supreme Constitutional Court rejected such a conception. The plaintiff in this 
case Mahmoud Samy v. The Ministry of Education filed a lawsuit before the 
Administrative Judicial Court against Isis Secondary School in Alexandria and the 
Ministry of Education.40 He alleged that his two daughters were prevented from being 
admitted to the school because they wore face-veils. In addition, he argued that such 
exclusion from their school violates Islamic Shari'a and the personal freedoms of people 
embodiedin the Egyptian constitution and laws. The Court decided to negate the school's 
decision on the basis of infringing on the constitution and the freedom of belief.  
 
B. Restricting women freedom to wear face-veils in some places with some 
conditions: 
Three judgments concluded the same legal outcome which restricts the freedom of 
women to wear face veils in public places; however, each one justified its result through 
different arguments. 
1. The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Constitutional Court 
Verdicts: 
After voiding the school's decision of banning the plaintiff's daughters from entering their 
school in the first instance court, the second degree court decided to send the dispute to 
the Supreme Constitutional Court in order to establish the school decision's 
constitutionality.41,42 
 
 ءادومع سولجم راروق موعز اومك ، ةوينمأ بابسلأ نكي مل ةعماجلا لخاد باقنلا ءادترا عنم نأ ينعي ام وهو ، اهدض نوعطملا نم ةعماجلا لخاد
. هتاذ دح ىف باقنلا ءادترا عنم وه يقيقحلا ببسلا امنإو ، ةعماجلاب تايلكلا 
 
39 Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education, 1026 (1996). 
40 The plaintiff filed the lawsuit number 21 for the judicial year 49. 
41 According to the Egyptian laws, the judge has the right to send and forward any dispute that is reviewed 
by him to the Supreme Constitutional Court in order to review the constitutionality of a certain law 
provision (s) that must be applied by him on the facts of such dispute.   
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The Supreme Constitutional Court annulled the Administrative Judicial Court's decision 
for a number of reasons. Firstly, theConstitutional Court argued that the guardian and 
superior of a certain place have the full power to determine the garments of women in 
such a place. Such garments have to be compatible with their society's existing traditions 
and customs.43Moreover, the court decided that taking off face-veil may lead to more 
modesty, shyness, and respectability for Muslim women as people shall know them; 
consequently, people may supervise and censor their diverse conducts and behaviors in 
the society.44 
 
Furthermore, the court argued that women's garments have to be modest, moderate, and 
compatible with their society's standards and not their personal ones.45 Accordingly, it 
argued that the face-veiled woman is immoderate in Egyptian society, thus the wearing of 
such veils may form an unacceptable behavior in the society. 
 
The Court decided that the decision to take off the face-veils is optional in Islam; it 
neither infringes on the freedom of belief nor the freedom of practicing religious rites: 
 
The issue of wearing veils is neither forbidden nor obligatory in Islam; 
accordingly, the decision of taking off face-veils does not relate to 
Islamic Shariaa, rather it relates to the regulation of a permissible issue.46 
 
 
 
42 The dispute (21 for the year 49 Mahmoud Samy v. the Ministry of Education) was sent to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court to be registered under number 8 for the judicial year 17. The verdict was issued on 
18/5/1996 
43 Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education,supra note39, at 1035. The original reads: ةمكحملا  فاضاو 
ئاس نوكي ام ءوض يلع اهبايث وا اهئادر ة يهل اديدحت اهقاطن يف ةيلمعلا ماكحلاا اهب عرشي يتلا ةلماكلا ةطلسلا رملاا يلول نوكي هنا" يف اد
تب اريغتم اهنومضم نوكي لبايعطق اصن اهموهفم مداصي لا يتلا مهفارعاو مهتاداع نم احيحص نوكي امم سانلا نيب اهعمتجم نامزلا ريغ
 .اهتديقع نع اريبعت ةأرملا ريبعت نوكيل يعرشلا هموهفمب رتسلا ققحت نا اهطباض ناك ناو ناكملاو 
44Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education,supra note39, at 1037. The original reads: 
  سانلا نم طلاخأب اهلاصتا يلع نوعأ اههجول اهفشك نا لب" ةمكحملا  فدراو  وهو ، اهكولس يلع ةباقرلا نم اعون نوضرفيو اهنوفرعي  
 .اهنع جرحلا عفرل يعدأو اهتيسفنل نوصأو اهرصب نم اهضغو اهئايحل لفكا كلذك  
45Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education supra note39, at 1038. The original reads: 
انم نوكي نا يغبني ةأرملا يز نا" ةمكحملا  فاضاو ازارطو ابهذم ابس-  ةيصخشلا اهسيياقمب لا-  اقفاوم نوكيو اهماشتحا يعاري امب نكلو
 ."اهعمتجم  لاخاو ديلاقتل 
46 Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education,supra note39, at 1038. The original reads: 
 ميظنت ةرئاد يف لخدي هيف نوعطملا رارقلا نا ةمكحملا  فاضاو ةديقعلا ةيرح يلع اتا تفا دعي لا مث نمو حابملا  
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The Court determined the freedom of belief notion as forcing someone to join another 
religion or to leave his current religion unwillingly. Accordingly, the notion of taking off 
the face veil is separate from this freedom. In addition, the Court did not consider the 
decision to take off face-veils as violating personal freedoms of women:  
 
Despite assuming that a person's garments reflect his/her  free will 
and freedom in choosing his/her  clothes, such freedom has to be 
limited to rights and matters that are closely related to his/her  own 
personality and personal life, for instance the right to choose his/her  
espouse/husband and to have a family and a baby. Consequently, 
such freedom shall not extend to issues that relate to public interest, 
such as determining specific garments that have to be respected in a 
specific place.47 
 
Finally, the court asserted that taking off the veil does not violate a woman's personal 
freedom as long as she belongs to a place that stipulates some conditions regarding people 
who belong to it: 
 
A face-veiled woman has to respect the unified garments that are put 
and determined by specific entities if she wants to join one of them, 
such as the armed forces, the police, and hospitals. Such distinct 
garments shall distinguish women who belong to specific entities 
from others who are outside their circles. Accordingly, it shall not be 
any violation to personal freedom if a woman is hampered from 
wearing face-veil in a certain place as long as she belongs to such 
place.48 
 
 
 
47Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education,supra note39, at 1036. The original reads 
 يعري ةيدرفلا ةيرحلل اقاطن لثمت يتلا رايتخلاا ةدارا رولبي اهيدتري يتلا ءايزلاا للاخ نم صخشلا رهظم نأب لوقلا زاج ناو هنا ثيحو
يف ناسنلاا ةيتاذب اطبترم ، ةيصخشلاب اقيصل نوكي ام يلع اهلمع لاجم رصق يغبني هذه رايتخلاا ةدارا نا لاا ، اهصئاصخ رهوجو اهتاموقم 
 ، ادلو صخشلا ذختي نأو ةرسلأا نيوكتو جوزلا رايتخا يف قحلاك اهدصاقم لبنأو اهتاهجوت  دأ يف ةيصخشلا هتايح حملام اهعم زربت ةرئاد
جي لاو يف نوعقي نيذلا ءلاؤه نو شل اطبض اهيف لاثام ماعلا حلاصلا نوكي اهتاذب ةرئاد يف رصحني ددحم ميظنت يلا اهطسب يلاتلاب زو
.  ...اهطيحم 
48 Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education, supra note39, at 1037. The original reads: 
ملا ةأرملل ةبسنلاب باقنلا ءادترا ناك اذإ ةروئاد ىوفو ةملوسملا ةأرملا مزتلت نأ اهيفاني لا ةيرحلا هذه نإف ةيصخشلا ةيرحلا رهاظم ىدحإ وه ةملس
اوهل نوكتل ةرئادلا هذه نم مهعقوم ىف صاخوووشلأا ضعب اهيدتري ىتلا ءايزلأا ىلع قفرملا وأ ةيرادلإا ةهجلا اهعضت ىتلا دويقلاب اهتاذب  اوهتيتاذ
ب ، اهريغب مهتيدرأ طلتخت لاف  اروسيمو موهب  اوفرعمو مهيولع  لااد موهب  اوقئلاو  اوسناجتم  ادوحوم موهيز نوكيل مهاوس نمع مهرهظم ىف نوخلسني ل
  اقدوصو  اوقح اوهيلإ نومتني نم نأش ىف رملأا سبتليل ،  اناودعو ةليغ اهنومحتقي نيرخلآ  ابهن هذه مهترئاد نوكت لاف ، مهعم لماعتلا روص اومك ، 
اوقلل ةبسنلاب نأشلا وه  اذوخأ اوهل  اوسابل باوقنلا  ضترا يتلا ةملسملا ةأرملا نإف كلذ ىلع  ابيترتو ، اهريغو تايفشتسملاو ةطرشلاو ةحلسملا ت
 جاردونلاا ىوف  وبغر ىوه نإ اهددوحت ىوتلا ةرئادولا  اوطن ىوف اهل نيمتنملا ىلع ءايزأ نم تاهجلا كلت هضرفت امب مزتلت نأ ةيصخشلا اهتيرحب
. ةرئادلا كلت دارفأ نمض  
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Accordingly, the Supreme Constitutional Court concluded that the complete prohibition 
of face-veils for women in a specific place for a specific period of time is legal, licit, and 
constitutional as such regulation does not violate personal freedom, freedom of belief, and 
freedom of practicing religious rites. 
 
2. RehamMostafa v. Ain Shams University:49 
The courts in RehamMostafa v. Ain Shams University supported the notion of restricting 
women to wear veils in public places. 
The First Degree Judgment: 
The plaintiff,RehamMostafa, filed a lawsuit against the head of Ain Shams University as 
its legal representative to annul its decision that encompassed the absolute ban of wearing 
face-veils in examhalls.50 Because of her refusal to take off her face-veil while taking her 
exams, the plaintiff was banned from continuing them. She alleged that such a ban 
contradicted the constitution, laws, human rights, personal freedoms, and the freedoms of 
belief and practicing religious rites. 
 
The Court rejected the plaintiff's allegations on the basis of the necessity doctrine. It 
alleged that despite the fact that wearing face-veils is a personal freedom which may not 
be touched, it should be controlled if the conditions necessitate doing so. The court 
argued that due to the complicated process of administering exams, besides the huge 
number of examined students and the security required in exams, it is necessary to restrict 
such freedom during the exam time parameters: 
 
Wearing a veil is a personal freedom that may be controlled and 
restricted in case of necessity. It is apparent from the case papers that 
there are some reasons which have obligated the university to issue 
its appealed decision, such as the hardship of examination works that 
needs complete capacity of all its employees, and rendering its 
administrative powers so as to accommodate hundreds of thousands 
of students attending examinations within a short period of time and 
limited space. Thus, there is no harm regarding a veiled student to 
 
49RehamMostafa v. Ain Shams University (2010). 
50 The first degree court decision was issued by the Administrative Judicial Court in 17/1/2010 in case 
number 10050 for the judicial year 64. 
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uncover her face during examination time as long as this is a 
temporary decision necessary for the smoothness of the examination 
and supervision processes which necessitate watching students' 
behavior and faces throughout the examination period.51 
 
The Second Degree Judgment:52 
The appellant (RehamMostafa) pursued the appeal number 13628 for the judicial year 56 
before the Supreme Administrative court. The appellant alleged that the first degree court 
violated the Egyptian constitution which safeguards personal freedom, equality, and the 
freedom of practicing religious rites from any infringements. The appellant added that it 
is irrational to oblige veiled women to uncover their face with the claim of achieving 
public welfare. She asserted her readiness to unveil her face so as to be identified 
whenever she was asked to do so, and to be searched for security reasons. 
 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Administrative Court deduced the same conclusion as 
the First Degree Court, it relied on different arguments to justify its legal outcome.53 The 
Supreme Administrative Court depended mainly on the opinion of The Egyptian High 
Commission for Religious Advisory Opinions (Dar Al-Ifta Al-Missriyyah) to prohibit the 
wearing of face-veils in specific places. Dar Al-Ifta advised in its opinion no. 14 dating 
13/2/2011 that the guardian and superior shall have the full power to control the 
examination process: 
It is permitted for the concerned authority (administration) as the 
authorized guardian and superior to control the examination process. 
Such an authority shall have the power to issue compulsory decisions 
that have to be religiously implemented by the examiners in the 
examination halls during the examinations time. Such opinion is 
based on the fact that wearing face-veils for women has been 
considered a tradition among most learned-Islamic scholars. In 
 
51RehamMostafa v. Ain Shams University, supra note 49 at 3. The original reads: 
 دويقلا ضعب ضرفو اهميظنت ةرورضلا ةلاح يف زوجي يتلا ةيصخشلا تايرحلا نم باقنلا ءادترا نأ ساسأ ىلع اهءاضق ةمكحملا تديشو 
  رادصإ ىلإ ةعماجلاب تدح  ابابسأ ةمث نأ  ارولأا هتعسو امم يدابلا نأو ،ةمئاق ةرورضلا ةلاح  ناك املاط اهيلع  حت هيف نوعطملا اهرارق
 تا م باعيتسلا ةمزلالا ةيرادلإا اهتانكم ةفاك عضوو اهب نيلماعلا فايطأ ةفاكل  لاماك  ارافنتسا بجوتست يتلا تاناحتملاا لامعأ ةأطو فلالآا
فشكت نأ ريض لا هنإف مث نمو ،ةروصحم نكامأ يفو ةددحم ةينمز ةرتف يف تاناحتملاا ءادلأ تابلاطلاو ةبلطلا نم  اههجو نع ةبقنملا ةبلاطلا
ملا لامعأ نأو ةصاخ تاهبشلل  ءاقتاو عئارذلل  ادسو تاناحتملاا ةيلمع ريس نسحل ةتقؤم ةفصب كلذ ناك املاط تاناحتملاا كلت ءادأ ءانثأ ةبقار
 و ،تاناحتملاا ءادأ ةرتف لاوط مههوجو ةصاخ ةفصبو تابلاطلاو ةبلطلا كولس ةبقارم يف نمكت شغلا تلااح دصرو نوعطملا رارقلا نوكي
هذيفنت فقول مزلالا ةيدجلا نكر هعم يفتني امم ةماعلا ةحلصملا قيقحتل ةحيحص تارابتعا ىلع ماق دق هيف هئاغلاو .  
 
52RehamMostafa  v. Ain Shams University, 3 (2011). 
53 The court's verdict was issued on 23/4/2011. 
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addition, it has been decided by Muslim scholars that a ruler is 
allowed to restrict permitted rights and freedoms, and the ruler here 
is the authorized administration.54 
 
Furthermore, Dar Al-Ifta argued that the appealed decision did not contradict article (2) of 
the 1971 Egyptian Constitution. Moreover, Dar Al-Ifta advised the administrative 
authority of the concerned university as its guardian that it should balance between 
garments of female students that guarantee their respect in their society on the one side 
and garments that reflect the society's religious values and social traditions on the other: 
The guardian, regarding the debatable matters, has the right to put 
specific rules in order to facilitate people's lives and to reflect what is 
acceptable of their habits and traditions as long as such rules are 
compatible with the Islamic Sharia. Accordingly, one of these rules 
is organizing the wear and garment of women (within a specific area) 
so as to cover their bodies and private parts... In addition, their ways 
of wearing garments must be in accordance with their religious 
values which in fact reflect the morals and traditions of their society. 
Furthermore, it shall be considered an unpleasant behavior if a 
woman insisted to wear face-veil in such circumstances as Maleky 
doctrine believed that covering women's face is regarded as a 
disagreeable behavior if it is not a tradition in the concerned society 
and they mentioned that it is considered "immoderation in trend.55 
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Administrative Court supported the legal decision of the first 
degree court; however, it handled the legal matter from a distinct perspective. 
 
C. Comparison and Analysis: 
 
54RehamMostafa  v. Ain Shams University, supra note 52, at 4. The original reads: 
 ةرادلاا ةهجل زوجي-  اهفادها قيقحتل ةيعرم طورش نم اهل امب ، تاناحتملاا نايرج ميظنت هب اطونم رملأل ايلو اهرابتعاب-  ارمأ ردصت نا
احتملاا تاعاق لخاد باقنلا ءادترا رظحب هعوضوم يف وه نم ةفاك يلع اعرش ذيفنتلا بجاو ءادترا نأ يلع اسيسأت اهئادا ةرتف ءانثا تان
 بملا دييقت مكاحلل نا مههقف دعاوق يف نيملسملا ءاملع يدل ررقت هناو ، ءاهقفلا روهمج دنع تاداعلا ليبق نم وه ةملسملا ةأرملل باقنلا ، حا
 .رملأا يلو يه ماقملا اذه يف ةرادلاا ةهجو 
55 يضقت يتلاو 1971 ماع رداصلا ةيبرعلا رصم ةيروهمج روتسد نم )2( ةداملا صن – مدقت ام لك يف – هيف نوعطملا رارقلا ضقاني لاو
 رملأا يلول نأ كلذ "عيرشتلل يسيئرلا ردصملا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ئدابمو ةيمسرلا اهتغل ةيبرعلا ةغللاو ةلودلا نيد ملاسلإا" نأب–  يف
 ةيفلاخلا لئاسملا– هنو ش سانلا ىلع رسيي امب داهتجلاا قح ةيلكلا دصاقملا لطعي لا امبو مهفارعأو مهتاداع نم  احيحص نوكي ام سكعيو م
 رملأا يلو مظني نأ اهيفاني لا يتلا مهتعيرشل–  اهتاذب ةرئاد يف–  ا بنم وأ اهندبب  ايشاو لاو اهيقاس وأ اهتروع نع  افشاك نوكي لاف ةاتفلا سابل
اهئايحل  ايفان وأ اهحملام نم هراهظإ زوجي لا امع  نأب اهيلع صن يتلا ةيميلعتلا لحارملا ىدحإب ةذيملت لك مزلأ نيح رارقلا اذه هاخوت ام وهو
ئلام نوكي نأ اذه  وف نيعتي اهيز ءادترا يف اهبولسأ نإ لب ،اهنتافم راهظإ وأ اهيرع نع  ايهان اهلذبت نود  لائاح  ابسانم اهيز نوكي اهميقل  ام
لاخأ يف ةرورضلاب جمدنت يتلا ةينيدلا تاعاق لخاد باقنلا رظح ةيعرشب لوقلا كلسي كلذ ءوض يف هنإ ثيح نمو .هديلاقتو اهعمتجم  
 هئادتراب كسمتلا نأ لب اهئادأ ةرتف ءانثأ تاناحتملاا–  رملأا اذه عم–  بهذم اعد ام اذهو ةعيرشلا مراكمب قيلي لا رملأا يلو ىلع تايتفأ وه
لا باقتنا نأ ىلع صنلا ىلإ هتمرب ةيكلاملا ."نيدلا يف ولغلا" نم هنإ اوركذو كلذب اهدلب لهأ ةداع رجت مل اذإ هوركم ةأرم  
."اهئادأ ةرتف ءانثأ تاناحتملاا تاعاق لخاد باقنلا رظح ةيعرش ىلإ ركذلا فلاس اهباتك يف ةيرصملا ءاتفلإا راد  هتناو 
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All of the previous judgments agreed on the fact that the face veil is separate from 
religious matters, namely the wearing of the face-veil is permitted in Islam; it is 
optional.56 Accordingly, it is neither mandatory nor prohibited in Islamic Shariaa,. The 
only court that did not rely on such a fact was the Court of Appeal in RehamMostafa  v. 
Ain Shams University.57 Despite the fact that wearing veils has been considered separate 
from religious debates, the court demanded the opinion of Dar Al-Ifta the highest 
committee in Egypt which is competent in giving religious opinions and advice. The 
Court required the opinion of Dar Al-Ifta on whether the guardian or the superior has the 
right in Islam to prohibit face-veils in universities and schools. Such a judicial decision 
reflects the court's policies and beliefs regarding the issue of wearing face-veils. The court 
believed it is a religious matter; consequently, it could not decide the case before 
inquiring about religious opinion. The court's judgment was issued in 2011; accordingly, 
the court absolutely knew the previous legal decisions that adjudicate the mater on a mere 
civil basis.58 Unfortunately, the court depended mainly on Dar Al-Ifta opinion without 
stating any other reason, argument, or justification for its mysterious approach. Such an 
approach should be understood in light of the court's policies. By and large, such 
differentiation in the judges' approaches can be comprehended in light of their different 
policies, ideologies, and beliefs.  
 
Despite the fact that both the first degree and the second degree courts regarding the case 
of Reham Mostafa v. Ain Shams University deduced the same conclusion, namely 
restricting the wearing of face-veil, each one of them provided distinct reasons and 
justifications according to respective beliefs and ideologies.59 Accordingly, if the second 
degree judge relied on the right of the guardian to regulate the issue of wearing face-veils 
in specific places, such as universities, the first degree one depended on the right of the 
administrative authority to regulate face-veil due to the range of practical considerations 
and necessary matters within the examination process, for instance, avoiding cheating.  
 
56 As I have previously asserted that wearing face veil is optional according to almost all the religious 
scholars; it is neither mandatory nor prohibited in Islam. 
57RehamMostafa  v. Ain Shams University, (2011). 
58 It is worth mentioning that Dar Al-Ifta's opinion admitted that wearing veils does not relate to a religious 
debate. 
59RehamMostafa  v. Ain Shams University, (2011). 
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Thus, if the first degree court depended on the examination process itself, the Court of 
Appeal relied on the authority of the guardian to regulate such examinations.  
 
 Despite the fact that the Supreme Constitutional and the Supreme Administrative Courts' 
judgments argued that the face-veiled woman is immoderate in trend in the Egyptian 
society, the wearing of such veils may form unacceptable behavior in this society; other 
verdicts considered it as acceptable behavior. They considered the same matter as an 
ordinary habit, and not criminalized by Egyptian laws; consequently, it is agreed upon 
conduct in Egyptian society. In spite of all being Egyptian judges who live in the same 
society, each one has his own policy, education, viewpoint, ideology, and beliefs as seen 
in these decisions. 
 
In addition, some judgments that handled the matter of prohibiting face-veils from the 
viewpoint of the guardian's authority in a certain society to restrict such freedom alleges 
that such guardian is the administrative authority, for instance the university. On the other 
hand others argued that it is the authority of the judge, while the third category 
emphasized the power of the legislature to completely ban face-veils in specific places. 
Such differentiation in comprehension reflects judges' differentiation in their policies.60 
 
Regarding the nexus between prohibiting the wearing of face-veils and personal freedom, 
we find two main judicial approaches that reflect different judges' policies. The first one 
which is adopted by all of the judgments except the Constitutional Court's one in 
Mahmoud Samy v. the Ministry of Education alleged that the complete restriction of face-
veils in specific places for specific periods of time infringes women's personal freedom. 
Even the Administrative Judicial court's judgment in RehamMostafa v. Ain Shams 
University that restricted such freedom admitted that such a restriction violates personal 
freedom; however, there is a necessity in doing so. On the contrary, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court's verdict in Mahmoud Samy v. the Ministry of Education, argued that 
the prohibition of face-veils in the previous circumstances does not violate women's 
 
60 Egyptian law provisions are absent from determining the authority that has the power to completely ban 
the freedom of wearing face-veils in specific places. Accordingly, the judiciary's discretionary power may 
play a great role in such an issue.   
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personal freedom as the relation between them is absent.The judgment argued that the 
personal freedom of individuals has to be limited to rights and matters that are closely 
related to their own personality and personal life; consequently, personal freedom is 
strongly connected to the private interests of people. At the same time, the court 
emphasized that personal freedom does not extend to issues that relate to public interest, 
for instance restricting the wearing of face-veils. 
 
Finally, the Constitutional Court's judges in Mahmoud Samy v. the Ministry of Education 
gave a distinct justification for banning face-veils that reflects the policy when they stated 
that "taking off face-veil may lead to more modesty, shyness, and respectability for 
Muslim women. Consequently, people may supervise and censor their diverse conducts 
and behaviors in the society."61 Despite rejecting such a point of view, it is still a 
respectable viewpoint that reflects the judges' ideologies and beliefs.   
 
To conclude this discussion, I would like to share my own experience as a judge. I wrote 
a judgment regarding the constitutional rights of face-veiled women in the Egyptian 
universities in 2010.62 I justified my decision on reasons that also reflect my own policies 
and viewpoints on the subject. I think the administrative authorities in the universities 
have to find constitutional, legal, and appropriate means to balance between both the 
public interest of the state and the private one of students.  Accordingly, it is irrational to 
hamper the right of women to wear face-veils on the basis that such garments may lead to 
the breach of law in universities, for instance, permitting cheating in exams. This is 
because the administrative authorities of universities have many other tools that may 
assure and guarantee the successful application of rules rather than the complete banning 
of face-veils for female students. Accordingly, such authorities may require all veiled 
students to unveil their face in order to verify their identities, and to be searched in order 
to be found free from possessing any means that could infringe the examination process.63 
In addition, it is illogical to educate and teach students the notions of personal freedoms, 
 
61 Mahmoud Samy v. The ministry of Education,supra note39, at 1037. 
62Maha Adel v. Cairo University (2010). 
63 Moreover, the administrative authority may decide to take all the mobile phones from students within the 
frame time of examinations. 
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freedom of belief and practicing religious rites, and to then ban them from practicing such 
freedoms practically.  
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III. Proof of Religious Conversion in National Identification Cards  
 
Changing one's religion, especially from Islam to any other religion has been a 
controversial issue for the Egyptian State Council for a long time. It relates to the 
freedom of belief and the practicing of religious rites in Egyptian society.  In this chapter, 
I am not aiming to discuss the purely religious matter of alteration of religious affiliation 
in Egypt; rather, I am focusing on a purely procedural and in that sense secular matter, 
namely the rules of evidence in supporting proof of such an alteration in the National 
Identification Card (ID). 
 
In that sense, we may distinguish between two main judicial points of view that 
adjudicate such matters.  On the one hand, the first judicial stream finds that the 
conversion of a religion, for instance from Islam to Christianity, must be reflected and 
proved on the National Identification Card, regardless of the issue of apostasy.This does 
not mean that the court recognizes such apostasy; it mainly relyies on notions of “public 
order” to sustain this argument. However, the other view finds that the change of a 
religion on the Identification Card infringes on the public order as such conduct admits 
apostasy which is prohibited by Islam as a religion.  The two conflicting decisions are 
detailed below and followed by a brief comparison and analysis. 
 
A. Proponents of Proof of Religious Conversion in National Identification 
Cards:  
 
The first opinion judges – because of their own ideologies and thinking – believe that any 
change in a citizen's information must be legally reflected and proved on his National 
Identification Card. The Identification Card should reflect the factual status of citizens in 
society. 
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1. GhadaBadawy v. Minister of Interior:64 
 
The case of GhadaBadawy v. Minister of Interior reflects a distinct meaning of public 
order; in addition, the court relied on the conception of a civic state to rationalize its legal 
judgment. 
The plaintiff in this case pursued a lawsuit before the Administrative Judicial Court against 
the Minister of Interior and the Head of the Civil Status Department65 in order to force 
them to modify her name and religion from Islam to Christianity on her National 
Identification Card.66 She alleged that she belonged to a Christian family and that her name 
was Ghada Tadros before changing her religion to Islam and her name to Ghada Badawy. 
She added that after adopting the Islamic religion for some years, she decided to re-adopt 
her original religion Christianity and had obtained the admission of the church to revert 
back to Christianity on 12/3/2001. However, the defendant refused to re-change her 
religion from Christianity to Islam in the ID on the grounds that such modification violated 
the Egyptian public order. Accordingly, the plaintiff sued the administrative authority on 
the grounds that its refusal infringed upon her freedom of belief and her right to practice 
the religion of her choice. 
 
The Administrative Judicial Court decided on 26/4/2005 to strike down the administrative 
authority's decision on the grounds that the conversion of religion did not violate the 
freedom of belief. The administrative authority, in return, appealed the case before the 
Supreme Administrative Court on 10/5/2005 on the grounds that the first instance court's 
judgment infringed on Egyptian public order. The Supreme Administrative Court issued its 
verdict on 9/2/2008, supporting the first instance judgment. The second degree court 
argued that the legislature gives special attention to the personal status data, such as the 
Identification Card because it encompasses all the essential civil information for citizens, 
for instance their sex, religion, employment, marital status, and nationality. Such 
information is required for the citizens’ formal and informal relations with their society.  
 
64GhadaBadawy v. Minister of Interior, 599 (2008). 
65 The Arabic translation for the Civil Status Department is  ةيندملا لاوحلأا ةحلصم 
66 The plaintiff in this case pursued the law suit number 24673 for the judicial year 58 before the first degree court 
(The Administrative Judicial Court). 
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Accordingly, the conversion of religion should be reflected and verified in the official 
papers because it may lead to serious consequences: 
 
                        Because of the importance of such information, it has to be 
accurate, precise, and to reflect the actual statuses of citizens. 
Accordingly, the Civil Status Authority has to register any new 
data for any and every citizen in his/her Identification Card 
provided that he/she presented what is required to prove such 
new information. In addition, the personal status law obliged 
every person who reached sixteen years old to apply for an 
Identification Card and to continuously update his information 
in order to truly reflect all the essential data which is required 
in his relation with the community.67 
 
Moreover, the court argued that the Civil Status Authority is bound by law to register any 
changes in the personal statuses of citizens even if such amendments involve religious 
beliefs. The Court states that all citizens have the right to change their religion provided 
that the new one is one of the three recognized religions in Egypt, namely Islam, 
Christianity, and Judaism. Furthermore, the court alleged that despite the fact that 
converting one's religion from Islam to Christianity is religiously prohibited in Islam, it is 
still legally permitted. This is because 
 
Changing a religion from Islam to Christianity in a person's 
Identification Card does not mean at all that the court 
recognized his apostasy because apostasy is not religiously or 
even legally recognized. However, such modification in 
religion has to be registered and proved because of the 
considerationsof the modern state. Such considerations 
necessitate that every citizen in the state has to carry an 
Identification Card. Since every change in a person's 
information may entirely change his legal position and status 
in his/her relation with people, official entities, or even the 
 
67GhadaBadawy v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note 64, at605. The original reads:  تانايب ديق ميظنتل ةصاخ ةياعر عرشملا ىلوأ
 ىلع ىتلاو نطاوملل ةيساسلأا ةيندملا تانايبلا يلع ىوطني ىذلا ءاعولا يه ةقاطبلا هذه نأ نابسحب ؛ ةيصخشلا قيقحت ةقاطب اهنمو ، نينطاوملل ةيندملا لاوحلأا
 هتفيظوو هتنايدو صخشلا عون ديدحت يف اهيلا نكتري يتلا ةيساسلاا ةقيثولا يهف ، دارفلاا وا ةيمسرلا تاهجلا يف لثمت ءاوسعمتجملا عم لماعتلا متي اهساسأ
 يلع عراشلا بجوا كلذل ، نطاوملل لاحلا عقاو نع اقدصو ًاقح ةربعم اهب ةنودملا تانايبلا نوكت نأ بجي هناف كلذلو .ةينوناقلا هتيلهأو ةيعامتجلاا هتلاحو
 ىلع ابيترت .تلايدعت يا اهيلع أرط اذا اهتانايب ثيدحت يلا اضيا ردابي ناو ، اماع رشع ةتس غلب يتم ةيصخشلا قيقحت ةقاطب جارختسا يلا عراسي نا نطاوملا
 ةيصخشلا قيقحت ةقاطب ىف نايبلا ديقت نأ ةصتخملا تاهجلا نع رداصلا نايبلا ةحص تبثت ىتلا قئاثولا تلماكت ىتم ةيندملا لاوحلأا ةحلصم ىلع بجي : كلذ
 .نايبلا ةملاسب ارارقإ وأ اهنم ًاميلست كلذ دعي نأ نود 
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whole community, the person's Identification Card must 
accurately reflect his/her civic and religious statuses.68 
 
Consequently, the court's main concern while adjudicating this case was the conception 
of a modern state where the citizen's rights and obligations in his community are derived 
from his/her civil status. 
 
In addition, the court provided a distinct definition of the public order in the context of 
changing religion.It stated that the conversion of a person's religion on his National 
Identification Card does not infringe at all on the Egyptian public order: 
 
The registration for the new religion does not change the 
plaintiff's religion in itself; rather it merely proves the new 
legal position and status for the plaintiff. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff's new legal status has been founded by the admission 
of the Christian authorities to change his religion to the 
Christianity. In other words, the modification of religion in the 
National Identification Card is a reflection for a certain reality 
which is the intent of the plaintiff to change his religion and 
the admission of the Church to do so.69 
 
The court concluded that the modification of religion in the Identification Card does not 
contradict public order. Accordingly it gave the example of marriage to prove its 
viewpoint. The court argued that the registration of a different religion resembles the 
registration of a marriage contract. This is because of the fact that marriage takes place 
factually before its registration; consequently, such registration is merely a way to prove 
this contract ex post facto.  
 
68
GhadaBadawy v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note 64, at606-607. The original reads:  ىلإ  ملاسلإا نم ةنايدلا  ليدعت  نايب  ديق
 ترقتسا امو ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ئدابمل ًاقبط هتدر ىلع رقي لا دترملا نلأ ، هب ماق ام ىلع صخشلا اذهل ارارقإ دعي لا ةيصخشلا قيقحت ةقاطب تانايب ىف ةيحيسملا
 ةيندملا هتلاح تبثت ةقيثو نطاوم لك ديب نوكي نأب ىضقت ىتلا ، ةثيدحلا ةلودلا تابلطتم ىلع لاوزن كلذ متي امنإو ،ضقنلا ةمكحم ماكحأو ةمكحملا هذه ماكحأ هيلع
 هتانايب نطاوملل تبثت نأ ةرادلإا ةهج ىلع : كلذ ىدؤم ـ هريغ هيف هكراشي لا صخشلل اينوناق ًازكرم بتري اهنم نايب لك نأ: كلذ ساسأ ـ ةنايدلا نايب اهيف امب ،
 ىتح ؛  اهب فرتعملا ثلاثلا ةيوامسلا تانايدلا نم ةنايدلا نوكت نأ : كلذ طرش ـ ليدعت نم هيلع أرطي امو ةنايدلا نايب اهنمو ، اهتابثإ خيرات ىف ىعقاو وحن ىلع
 عم ةيصخشلا قيقحت ةقاطب ىف كلذ تبثي نأ ىلع ، اهقنتعي ىتلا ةنايدلا هيلع بترتملا ىنوناقلا هزكرمو ، ةيصخشلاو ةيندملا هتابجاوو هقوقح اهئوض ىف ددحتت
 ىف ددحتي ىذلا هلاح عقاوو ةيقيقحلا صخشلا تادقتعم نع قدصب ةقاطبلا ربعت نأ بجي : كلذ ساسأ ـ ملاسلإل صخشلا قانتعا قبس ىلإ ةقاطبلا هذه ىف ةراشلإا
 .قيبطت ـ ىنوناقلا هزكرم هئوض 
 
69GhadaBadawy v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note 64, at606. The original reads:  ةرادلاا ةهجل زوجي ناك ام" هنأ ةمكحملا  فاضاو
جمب لعفلاب ئشنأ زكرملا اذه نلأ اينوناق ازكرم ئشني لا هتاذ دح يف ديقلاف .ماعلا ماظنلل كلذ ةفلاخم ةلوقمب يعدملا ديق نع عانتملاا نم ةنبا اهدض نوعطملا لوبق در
ا وه ام ديقلاو ، ةيحيسملا ةنايدلا تانب اهقنتعي يتلا ةنايدلا ةقيقحب ريغلل انلاعا ، عقاولا ةقيقح نع ربعيل ديقلا لبق لماكت ينوناق زكرمو روكنم ريغ عقاول ريرقت لا
لا نع جتانلا ينوناقلا زكرملا ئشني يذلا وه سيل ديقلاف جاوزلا تانايب ديق لثم كلذو ساسلاا اذه يلع هعم لماعتلا متي يتح نأشلا بحاص هنا لب جاوز ديق حصي لا
 ".هناكرأ  لماكتو لعفلاب مت جاوز ةمث ناك اذا لاا جاوزلا ةعقاو 
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On the other hand, the court decided that the refusal to convert the religion by the 
administrative authority actually contradicts public order: 
 
The Identification Card should reflect the factual statuses of 
citizens, especially their religions because they may lead to 
serious consequences. Consequently, if a person's true religion 
is not proved in his Identification Card, this may lead to many 
social complications that are prohibited bymany religions, such 
as the marriage that may take place between an apostate and a 
Muslim woman.70 
 
In short, the Supreme Administrative Court, as a court of appeal,71 supported the first 
instance court in its previous verdict for the same legal reasons that were embodied in such 
legal judgment. 
 
B. Opponents of Proof of Religious Conversion in National Identification 
Cards:  
 
The Second opinion judges argued that the conversion of a religion on the National 
Identification Card contradicts Islamic values and the Egyptian Constitution. 
 
1. Reda Mohamed Ali v. Minister of Interior:72 
 
Unlike the previous case, the court in the case Reda Mohamed Ali v. Minister of Interior 
understood and handled the conception of public order and the civic state from a different 
perspective.  
 
The plaintiff in this case filed a lawsuit on 22/12/2005 before the Administrative Judicial 
Court against the Minister of Interior and the head of the Civil Status Department in order 
to force them to modify his name and religion from Islam to Christianity on his National 
 
70GhadaBadawy v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note 64, at606. The original reads:  نايبلا ديق نع عانتملاا نا" ةلئاق ةمكحملا تدرطتساو
 يذلا وه نطاوملل ةيعقاولا ةلاحلا نع ربعي يذلا عمتجملا يف لماعتي صخشلا نا كلذ يلع بترتي ذا ، ةنايدلا نايبب قلعتي ناك اذا ةصاخ ، ماعلا ماظنلا عم مداصتي
لثم جاوز ةلاحك ، اهب عوطقم ةيعرش تاروظحمو ةيعامتجا تاديقعت يلا يدؤي دق امم ، هرئاعش ءادا يلع صرحيو هقنتعي يذلا نيدلا فلاخ يلع  صخشلا اذه
 ةملسم نم دترملا ."ةيلكلا اهلوصا نم لاصا دعيو اعطاق اميرحت ةيملاسلاا ةعيرشلا همرحت رما وهو  
71 The Interior Affairs Minister v. GhadaBadawy in the appeal no. 64 for the judicial year 50. 
72Reda Mohamed Ali v. Interior Affairs Minister, (2007). 
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Identification Card.73 He alleged that he belonged to a Christian family and his original 
name was Basel RedaHalim before changing his religion to Islam and his name to Reda 
Mohamed Ali on 14/10/2000. He added that after adopting Islam for some years, he 
decided on 22/6/2005 to re-adopt his original religion, Christianity, and he obtained the 
permission of the church to return back to its fold. However, the defendant refused to re-
change his religion from Christianity to Islam on the grounds that such modification 
violated the Egyptian public order. Accordingly, the plaintiff sued the administrative 
authority on the grounds that its refusal infringed upon his freedom of belief and right to 
practice his religious rites. 
 
The court in its judgment on 29/5/2007 comprehended the matter of modifying the Islamic 
religion on the National Identification Card from a distinct point of view.74 It emphasized 
the freedom of belief and the right to practice religion in Islam; however, it decided that 
changing a religion does not relate to such freedoms: 
 
The court underlined the great difference between these two 
kinds of freedoms from one side and the notion of 
manipulating religious affiliation for other purposes. The idea 
of changing religion relates mainly to the notion of 
manipulation; consequently, it is apart from the freedom of 
belief and practicing religious rites. This is due to the fact that 
some manipulators seek to achieve some private goals from 
changing their religious affiliation.75 
 
Moreover, the court argued that those manipulating religious affiliation want to ridicule 
and mock the two religions, namely the one which they adopted earlier and the later one. 
The court stated that the conversion of a religion passes through two phases:  
 
 
73 The plaintiff in this case pursued the law suit number 8515 for the judicial year 60 before the Administrative Judicial Court 
(the first degree court). 
74 It is worth mentioning that the Supreme Administrative Court adopted the same legal opinion of this 
court as a first instance court in the Appeal no. 121 for the judicial year 49. 
75Reda Mohamed Ali v. Interior Affairs Minister, supranote72, at7. The original reads:  هذه ءاضق ناك ن لو هنإ ثيح نمو
علا ةيرح أدبم ءلاعإ ىلع اهماكحأ نم ديدعلا يف رقتسا دق ةمكحملا يف اهنإف ،ناسنلإا صخشب ةقيصللا ةيساسلأا ئدابملا دحأك ةينيدلا رئاعشلا ةسراممو ةديق
ةيرح نم ضعبلا هبلطي ام نيبو ، ةينيدلا رئاعشلا ةسرامم و داقتعلاا ةيرح نيب ريبك  راف ةمث دجوي هنأ ىلع دكؤت ةحورطملا ىوعدلا  اطن  يف بعلاتلا
 ل يرخأ يلإ ةنايد نم رييغتلاب داقتعلاا ةيويند برآم قيقحت  
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The manipulation process commences by manipulating the 
original religion that the manipulator affiliates which is proved 
in all his/ her official documents, beside his relations with 
people in his community. Moreover, after changing his religion 
for a while the manipulator aims to mock the new adopted 
religion through deciding to abandon affiliating it suddenly 
after dealing with people by the name of this new religion.76 
 
The Court emphasized that Islam respects all of the monotheistic religions, and it 
recognizes that each religion of these has its own distinct rules that should be honored. 
Moreover, it argued that there is a massive difference between the freedom to convert to a 
religion and the freedom of belief. The court articulated a distinct definition for freedom of 
belief: 
The freedom of belief means that Islam does not coerce 
anybody to adopt its own rules and beliefs. However, if a 
person intended willingly to embrace this religion, he shall be 
bound by its strict rules, such as the complete prohibition of 
apostasy. This person knows in advance, before changing his 
religion to Islam, that he is religiously banned from re-changing 
his beliefs to any other religion. In addition, despite being 
advised by Christian scholars before changing his religion from 
Christianity to Islam (at the first time), such person insisted to 
change to Islam.77 
 
As a result, the court concluded that it is irrational to give the claimant the chance to return 
to his first religion as his behavior is a form of pure mockery and manipulation of religious 
affiliation.  
 
 
76Reda Mohamed Ali v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note72, at7. The original reads:  رمي بعلاتلا كلذ نا ةمكحملا  فاضاو
 متو ، ةرادلإا ةهج نم ةيمسر تادنتسم هساسأ ىلع تردصو ، هقنتعي ناك يذلا نيدلاب بعلاتلاب أدبت امهلوأ  نيتلحرمب هتقيقح يف  نينطاوملا عم هتلاماعت
ذو ، اهئوض ىلع نيرخلآا عم اهللاخ لماعتو هتايح نم ةرتف اهيلإ فرصنا يتلا ةنايدلاب بعلاتلاب امهيناثو ،  نيدلا كلذ ءوض ىلع مهريغو ةدوعلا معزب كل
 كلذب ىرخلأا ةينيدلا ةهجلا ةقفاوم ىلع لوصحلاو يلولأا هتنايد يلإ 
77  ةمث نود هيف لوخدلا ةيرحو ،داقتعلاا ةيرح ىلع موقي هساسأ يف يملاسلإا نيدلا ناكو هب ةصاخلا هماكحأ ةيوامسلا نايدلأا نم نيد لكل ناك املو
 عا وأ ةرطف هيلع دلُو نم عنمت هيف لخد نم لك اهاضترا يتلا هماكحأ لوصأ نأ لاإ ،ىرخلأا ةيوامسلا تانايدلل  لماكلا همارتحا عم هاركإ كلذ دعب  هدقت
ةرحلا هتدارإب لج دعب لاإ  اعقاوو  افرع متي لا  ملاسلإا يلإ ةيحيسملا نم ةنايدلا رييغت نأو ةصاخ ،رخآ نيد يأ يلإ دادترلاا ىوعدب هيلع جورخلا نم تاس
هيلع فراعتم وه ام ىلع يحيسملا نيدلا لاجر اهب موقي داشرلإاو حصنلل  ، لا  افوزع هنع فزاع يحيسملا هنيد كرات نأب عطقي ام وهو لخديل هيف ةعجر
ملاسلإا نيدلا نم جورخلا وأ ةدرلاب دادتعلاا مدع اهنمو هدعاوقو هماكحأب مازتللاا  ايضار ،هاركإ نود هتدارإ ءلمب يملاسلإا نيدلا يف ءاوس كلذ دعب  ي
لأاب بعلاتلا يلإ ىدؤي كلذ ريغب لوقلا نلأ ةيلك يوامس نيد ريغ يلإ جورخلا وأ  رخآ يوامس نيد يلإ ةدوعلاب عم ضراعتي امب عئارشلاو دئاقعلاو نايد
نيد ة يه نم يملاسلإا نيدلا نع جراخلا عوجر لوبق هعم يحضي يذلا رملأا ،عمتجملا رارقتساو ماعلا ماظنلا  اهضرفي يتلا ةرملآا دعاوقلا ىرخأ ةي
ئاقع تافلاخ نوتأ يف ةينيدلا تادقتعملاب جزو ،اهيف لخد يتلا ةيملاسلإا ةنايدلا ىلع ءادتعا .ةيد  
 
 
32 
 
Furthermore, the court rejected the notion of changing a religion from Islam to another 
religion on the basis of violating public order considerations. The court argued that the 
apostate has private interests for converting his religion; consequently, the court should not 
permit him to do so. Specifically, the court states that: 
 
Islam is the official religion of Egypt as most of its citizens are 
Muslim. Accordingly, Islamic values form one of the essential 
bases of Egyptian public order. One of these values is the 
complete ban from disowning Islam. The freedom of belief is not 
free of any regulations; consequently, it has to respect and to be in 
accordance with Egyptian public order and public morals. 
Therefore, if the administrative authority admitted the change of 
religion from Islam to any other religion, such conduct shall 
absolutely violate the public order of Egyptian society.78 
 
The court maintained that despite the fact that it has no authority over the internal beliefs of 
the apostate, it would not officially recognize apostasy, namely in the apostate’s official 
papers, including the National Identification Card. In addition, the court argued that many 
apostates manipulate the legal system through religious conversion to satisfy their private 
and illicit interests, such as the Christian who changes his religion to Islam in order to 
divorce his Christian wife, then attempts to return to his original faith after achieving his 
goal.  
 
C. Comments and Analysis: 
Though contradictory in their final judicial holding, State Council judges in the above two 
cases relied on the same legal provisions, namely international treaties, such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Egyptian constitution, in 
order to resolve the matter of religious conversion.  Both recognize that there is no explicit 
 
78Reda Mohamed Ali v. Interior Affairs Minister, supra note 72, at10. The original reads:     هنا ةمكحملا  فاضاو
 رقتسا دق" يئاضقلا نادجولايلع  ماظنلل ةاعارمو  ةيوامسلا نايدلأا  ىلع لياحتلا نم  اعنم صوصخلا اذه يف  ةعوفرملا ىواعدلا ضفر
ملا بادلآاو ماعلا نيدلا وه ةلودلا نيد نأ ىلع روتسدلا يف صنلا نع ةيلك رظنلا ضغب يملاسلإا نيدلاب اهينطاوم بلغا نيدي ةلود يف  ةيعر
 ةيلصلأا مهتنايد يلع نيجراخلا ضعب ءاوهلأ  ةيطم اهذاختاو  ةيوامسلا نايدلأا كلت ىلع لياحتلا هعم زوجي لا امم همدع نم  يملاسلإا
كحأو اهبادآب نيبعلاتملا ريغ مهبرآم قيقحت نيحل يرخأ تانايدو ءامسأ ءارو يفختلاب ةيئاضقلا ماكحلأاو نوناقلا ىلع نيجراخلا وأ اهما
 . انوناقو  اعرش ةيوسلا 
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provision that prohibits religious conversion from Islam to another, but rather that the 
Egyptian constitution states that the freedom of belief and the practicing of religious rites 
are guaranteed.  Accordingly, each of the two judges interpreted the freedom of belief and 
the notion of the civil state from a distinct point of view that allows for judicial activism 
from the bench.  
The first judge mainly relied on the civil state notion to comprehend and recognize the 
concept of converting from Islam to a different religion. Consequently, he exhibited a 
preference for Islamic values and beliefs on the one side and the civil state concept and 
practical considerations on the other. In spite of respecting Islamic values through 
recognizing the religious prohibition of apostasy, this judge preferred the conception of a 
civil modern state because of his own ideological basis. Accordingly, he adopted the view 
that revolved around the notion of freedom: every citizen is free to do whatever he wants 
provided that he does not harm anyone and his behavior is not banned by law.  
Moreover, the judge emphasized the civic status of citizens which must accurately reflect 
his legal status in the society; as it determines his rights and duties in the community. Thus, 
he alleged that recognizing the change of the Islamic religion on the National Identification 
Card to any other religion does not recognize apostasy, namely the new religion that the 
apostate believes in. Rather, the judge argued that religious conversion does not violate 
Islamic values at all but merely reflects the apostate’s internal beliefs that should also be 
shown in official papers.  
On the other hand, the second judgment Reda Mohamed Ali v. Minister of Interior handled 
the whole matter from a religious viewpoint as opposed to relying mainly on the notion of 
a civic state. Accordingly, the second judicial stream considered the conversion of Islamic 
religion to another religion on the National Identification Card as pure apostasy and 
manipulation of religions. It contended that such permission infringed on religions' 
sacredness and respectability. In addition, the judgment distinguished between the freedom 
of belief and the freedom to change religions. It determined that the freedom of belief in 
Islam means that a religion does not coerce a person into adopting its own rules and 
beliefs; every person is free in his religious affiliation. Whereas the freedom to change a 
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religion means that a person wants to manipulate two religions in order to escape from the 
strict rules in one of them to more flexible ones in the other for a fixed period of time 
before returning back to his original religion after finishing his illicit goal – typically in 
matters of divorce and inheritance.  
Regarding the issue of converting religions, each of the two judges posits a distinct 
definition and determination of public order based on his own beliefs and ideologies. The 
first judge inGhada Badawy v. Minister of Interior believed that public order necessitates 
accurate civil status data for every citizen in society. This is because such civic information 
determines many crucial consequences for a citizen. Thus, the court concluded that dealing 
with a citizen through a manner that contradicts his genuine, civil and personal status, 
especially religious ones may lead to results that violate public order, such as the marriage 
between a Christian man and a Muslim woman which is religiously prohibited in Islam.  
Unlike the previous judgment, the court in Reda Mohamed Ali v. Minister of Interior 
argued that because Islam is the formal religion of Egypt, any conduct that violates Islamic 
values must always and by definition infringe upon Egyptian public order. Thus, 
conversion from Islam to any other religion violates public order as apostasy is religiously 
prohibited in Islam.  
Ultimately, if the first legal opinion in GhadaBadawy v. Minister of Interior because of the 
judge's own beliefs and persuasions depended fundamentally on the civil state conception, 
the second judicial stream in Reda Mohamed Ali v. Minister of Interior relied mainly on the 
Islamic state notion. In addition, if the second judgment found that conversion from Islam 
to any other religion violates public order, the first judgment contradicts this viewpoint 
through arguing that the non-alteration of one's religion might infringe upon Egyptian 
public order. Accordingly, each judge viewed Egyptian public order from a different 
viewpoint because of the differences in their ideological biases.  
The next chapter discusses another case which reflects the differentiation between judges 
in their persuasions and thoughts. It relates to the right to reject disabled persons from 
official posts because of their disabilities. Some judicial judgments support such a 
conception, whereas others reject it. 
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IV. Appointment of Visually Impaired Citizens to Diplomatic Service  
 
Modern societies try hard to protect the human rights of their members whether abled or 
disabled. The guarantee and protection of persons' rights is one of the vital challenges that 
face many societies. Moreover, the appointment of people with disabilities in either the 
sphere of public or in private businesses is considered essential to human rights in modern 
societies. Accordingly, many international and national conventions, constitutions, and 
domestic laws seriously attempt to preserve such a right through notions of equality 
between the abled and disabled.  
 
The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities issued by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 1975, in addition to the Egyptian Constitution confirm 
the principles of equality and equal opportunities among citizens without discrimination.79 
Accordingly, all people have equal rights and duties, for instance the state guarantees the 
right to work for every citizen on the basis of equality and justice principles. 
 
Domestic Egyptian laws and regulations try hard to safeguard the disabled work rights; 
they grant the disabled a specific quota in public profession appointments.80 Accordingly, 
 
79The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,1975. It is very important to provide such a 
convention in this chapter because both judicial viewpoints illustrated in this study depend on it to 
rationalize their opinion. Available at: http://www.un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml 
80Article 9 of the Egyptian Constitution 2014 states that: The State shall ensure equal opportunities for all 
citizens without discrimination. The original reads:  زييمت نود ،نينطاوملا عيمج نيب صرفلا ؤفاكت قيقحتب ةلودلا مزتلت 
In addition, the constitution provides in article 12 that" work is a right, duty, and honor guaranteed by the 
state. "The original reads:ةلودلا هلفكت فرشو ,بجاوو ,قح لمعلا . 
 Article 14 provides that: Public offices are a competence-based right for all citizens without bias or 
favoritism, and are deemed a mandate to serve the people. The Arabic translation reads:  قح ةماعلا  فئاظولا  
،بعشلا ةمدخل اهب نيمئاقلل فيلكتو ،ةطاسو وأ ةاباحم نودو ،ةءافكلا ساسأ ىلع نينطاوملل 
Article 53 of the Constitution states that "All citizens are equal before the Law. They are equal in rights, 
freedoms and general duties, without discrimination based on religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, 
language, disability, social class, political or geographic affiliation or any other reason. Discrimination and 
incitement of hatred is a crime punished by Law. The State shall take necessary measures for eliminating all 
forms of discrimination." The original reads:  تابجاولاو تايرحلاو  وقحلا ىف نوواستم مهو ،ءاوس نوناقلا ىدل نونطاوملا
 وأ ،ىعامتجلاا ىوتسملا وأ ،ةقاعلإا وأ ،ةغللا وأ ،نوللا وأ ، رعلا وأ ،لصلأا وأ ،سنجلا وأ ،ةديقعلا وأ ،نيدلا ببسب مهنيب زييمت لا ،ةماعلا
 ريبادتلا  ذاختاب  ةلودلا  مزتلت  .نوناقلا  اهيلع  بقاعي  ةميرج  ةيهاركلا  يلع  ضحلاو  زييمتلا  .رخا  ببس  يلا وا  يفارغجلا  وا  يسايسلا  ءامتنلاا
.زييمتلا لاكشا ةفاك يلع ءاضقلل ةمزلالا 
Moreover, article 81 of the constitution states that "The State shall guarantee the health, economic, social, 
cultural, entertainment, sporting and educational rights of persons with disabilities and dwarves, strive to 
provide them with job opportunities, allocate a percentage of job opportunities to them, and adapt public 
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Egyptian laws attempt strongly to achieve equality between the abled and disabled. 
Nevertheless, many private and public employers reject the appointing of disabled 
persons on the basis that they are not qualified enough to fulfill posts' requirements. 
 
The question arises in State Council case law concerning the right of the Egyptian 
Foreign Ministry to reject visually impaired applicants from appointment in its diplomatic 
and consular services. There are two main judicial viewpoints regarding this matter; the 
first believes in the inadmissibility of these applications as the required physical fitness 
stipulations are absent; consequently, the Ministry is under no obligation to form special 
committees to examine them.  
 
The other point of view finds that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is legally obligated to 
accept such applications, and that it should take the necessary measures and precautions 
to enable the visually impaired citizens to compete with other applicants. Moreover, this 
judicial opinion contends that the deprivation of the visually impaired citizens from 
applying to this type of jobs is considered discrimination against them; such 
discrimination clearly contradicts the Egyptian Constitution and the International 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
 
facilities and their surrounding environment to their special needs. The State shall also ensure their exercise 
of all political rights and integration with other citizens in compliance with the principles of equality, justice 
and equal opportunities. The original reads:   ا يداصتقاو ا يحص ،مازقلأاو ةقاعلإا  ىوذ صاخشلأا  وقح نامضب ةلودلا  مزتلت
 ةطيحملا ة يبلاو ةماعلا قفارملا ة يهتو ،مهل اهنم ةبسن صيصخت عم ،مهل لمعلا صرف ريفوتو ،ا يميلعتو ا يضايرو ا يهيفرتو ا يفاقثو ا يعامتجاو
.صرفلا ؤفاكتو ةاواسملاو ةلادعلا ئدابمل لاامعا نينطاوملا نم مهريغ عم مهجمدو ةيسايسلا  وقحلا عيمجل مهتسراممو مهب 
Article (2) of the Egyptian Law of Rehabilitation of Disables no. 39 for the year 1975 states "the disabled is 
meant for every person became incapable to depend on himself to practice work with stability or deficiency, 
as a result of, physical or mental or sensational shortage or congenital deficit since birth. Rehabilitation of 
Disables is meant to provide social, psychological, medical, educational and vocational services for the 
handicapped or his family to help him overcome effects resulted in his disability." The Arabic translation 
reads:  
 دصقي لمعب مايقلا وأ لمع ةلوازم ىف هسفن ىلع دامتعلاا ىلع رداق ريوغ حبوصأ صخش لك , وعملا ةملكب نوناقلا اذوه ماكحا قيبطت ىوف رخآ
.ةدلاولا ذنم يقلخ زجع ةجيتن وأ يوسح وأ يلقع وأ يوضع روصقل ةجيتن كلذ ىلع هتردق  صقنو هيف رارقتسلااو 
نيكمتل  هترسأو   وعملل  اهريفوت  مزلي  يتلا  ةينهملاو  ةيميلعتلاو  ةيبطلاو  ةيسفنلاو  ةيعامتجلاا  تامدخلا  ميدقت  نيوقوعملا  ليوهأتب  دصوقيو نم  ه
 ىتلا راثلآا ىلع بلغتلا.هزجع نع  فلخت 
Article (3) of the same law states that "each handicapped has the right of rehabilitation, and the state 
provides these services free of charge within the limits of financials listed for this purpose in the State 
Budget…"  The original reads:  اذوهل ةوجردملا غلابملا دودوح يف لباقم نود ليهأتلا تامدوخ ةولودلا يدؤوتو ,ليهأتلا قوح  ووعم لكل
 ةلودلل ةماعلا ةنزاوملا ىف ضرغلا 
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1. Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:81 
The plaintiff in this case was visually impaired; he held a Bachelor's degree in Political 
Science from the American University in Cairo (AUC) in 2011.82 He then applied to the 
Diplomatic and Consular Service competition in 2012, and asked for a special committee 
to examine him taking into consideration his disability. Because this issue is 
controversial, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the State Council's Advisory 
Department for its legal opinion.83 The advisory department judges were divided into two 
groups; the first one rejected the notion of appointing the plaintiff as a visually impaired 
person to diplomatic and consular posts, whereas the second group supported it. 
 
A. Opponents of Appointing Visually impaired citizens to Diplomatic Posts: 
The first opinion judges – because of their own ideological biases – believed that the 
rejection of the visually impaired in such professions does not discriminate against him; 
thus it is compatible with the law. In addition, the judges asserted that the inadmissible 
discrimination takes place between similar citizens, and there is no doubt that lack of 
sight makes the visually impaired different from his sighted counterpart, especially for 
this kind of job which depends mainly on sight. This viewpoint added that it is not 
accepted to state that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities grants 
rights to disabled persons to hold all positions, whatever their types or tasks or 
requirements are not matching with their disabilities. For instance, to have a handicap in 
the legs of a person with disability prohibits him from being a policeman.84 
 
 
81Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry,1 (2013). 
82 The case file no is 6/32/2/45 and the opinion has been issued from the Opinion Department of Justice, 
Foreign and Interior Affairs Ministers that follow the Egyptian State Council in 5/8/2013. 
83 The Opinion Department is a judicial one which follows the State Council and it consists of judges whose 
main tasks are to give legal opinions to the administration regarding the debatable issues. It is called in 
Arabic:  ةلودلا سلجمب يوتفلا مسق 
84Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 4. The Arabic original 
reads:  يسامولبدلا كلسلا فئاظو يف نييعتلل مهتابلط لوبق مدع ببسب رصبلا يدقاف صاخشلأا دض نوناقلل فلاخم زييمت ةمث دجوي لا هنإ
 ةساحل ةفئاطلا كلت نادقف نأب لوقلا يف ةضاضغ لاو ،ههباشتملا فورظلا يوذ نيب نوكي هنع يهنملا زيمتلاف .يلصنقلاو يف مهلعجي راصبلإا
 .اهلغش تاموقم دحأ اهيف رصبلا ةملاس دعت ةفيظو ىلإ ةبسنلاب ةصاخ ،نيرصبملا مهئارظن نع فلتخم عضوو نأب لوقلا لوبقملا ريغ نم
 نإو ىتح اهلاكشأو اهعاونأ فلاتخا ىلع فئاظولا ةفاك لغش يف  اعملا صخشلا ةيقحأ ةقاعلإا يوذ صاخشلأا  وقح ةيقافتا هذه ىدؤم
اك هيمدق ىف ةقاعإب  اباصم  اصخش ةطرشلا طباض ماهمب موقي نأ ،لاثملا ليبس ىلع روصُتي لاف .هتقاعإ عم بسانتت لا اهماهمو اهتايضتقم  ن
ةكرحلا نع هزجعت.  
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Accordingly, this legal opinion held that the visually impaired lacks a critical capability 
that is required for the diplomatic and consular service, namely meeting the medical and 
health fitness requirement.85 They underlined the fact that the right to work for persons 
with disabilities is ensured; however, such work should meet certain conditions in order 
for it to be approved. This opinion asserted that: 
The right to work for the handicapped is guaranteed according to the 
convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the constitution; 
however, it stops at a rational limit. Such limit is the rational measures 
and procedures that can be provided by the administration for the 
handicapped. Consequently, if these procedures are absurd or irrational 
the administration commitment is over and so the handicapped right to 
practice work terminates.86 
 
Judges who adopted the opinion of barring the visually impaired citizens from the 
diplomatic and consular careers tried to strengthen their point of view by focusing on 
some practical considerations, for instance financial ones. They asserted that the 
reasonableness of the visually impaired citizens' appointment should not lead to 
unnecessary burdens upon the Ministry:  
Regarding the exams the Foreign Ministry will afford financial expenses in 
the formation of special committees to examine them; this notion may be 
unsuitable to the Ministry's budget. Moreover, in the case of passing exams 
and appointing them as diplomats, the Ministry will be committed to provide 
them with special arrangements along their serving period .These measures 
represent overload and extra financial burdens which are disproportionate to 
the Ministry's budget at least for the time being and the unfavorable 
economic conditions  of the country.87 
 
85Article (6) of Consular and diplomatic law no. 45 for the year 1982 states that "It is required to be 
appointed the follow:  
1- To prove medical and health fitness for the job supervised by specialized medical council.    
2- To pass successfully the competition exam the Ministry conducts for this purpose." 
In Arabic it reads: : ىلي ام قحلم ةفيظو ىف نيُعي نميف طرتُشي 
1.  نأصتخملا ىبطلا سلجملا ةفرعمب ةفيظولل ةيحصلا هتقايل  بثت. 
2  نارغلا اذهل ةرازولا هيرجت ىذلا ةقباسملا ناحتمإ حاجنب زاتجي ض  
 
86Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 4. The original reads:  قحلا
  عم  ةاواسملا  مدق  ىلع  لمعلا  يف دح  دنع  فقي  هنكلو  ،ةيقافتلاا  كلت  ماكحأ  ىضتقمب  نيقاعملا  صاخشلأل  كش  لاب  لوفكم  نيرخلآا
 لمعلا  ةسرامم  يف   اعملا  صخشلا  قح  مث  نم  طقسو  اهريفوتب  ةرادلإا  مازتلا  ىضقنا  ،ةلوقعم  ريغ  تابيترتلا  هذه   ناك  اذإف‘‘ةيلوقعملا’’
 .نيرخلآاب ةاواسملاب ينعملا 
- 87The original reads:  هقحل  اعملا صخشلا ةسرامم ىلع بترتي لاأ وه ،ةيقافتلاا ماكحأب ءاج امك ،صوصخلا اذه يف ةيلوقعملا طانمو
لا لوبق نأ ىلإ رظنلابو ،هيلعو .‘يرورض ريغ وأ بسانتم ريغ  ا بع’’ ةرادلإا ليمحت ،ةمزلالا ةيريسيتلا ريبادتلا ذاختا دعب ،لمعلا يف تابلط
صبلا يدقاف صاخشلأا نم ةمدقملا لمحت يضتقي يلصنقلاو يسامولبدلا كلسلا فئاظو يف نييعتلا  ةقباسمب ةصاخلا تارابتخلااب  احتللال ر
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Ultimately, this opinion concludes that if some foreign countries try to protect human 
rights through appointing disabled persons such as the visually impaired citizens in some 
sensitive jobs, it is not a must for this country to appoint them in such places in order to 
reach the same targets.88Accordingly, opponents of appointing the visually impaired 
citizens in the diplomatic posts believe that such viewpoint does not discriminate against 
disabled persons because they lack the requirements of the concerned posts. The issue of 
lacking the stipulations of a certain post, such as the medical one depends on judges' own 
experiences, beliefs, and thoughts.   
 
B. Proponents of Appointing Visually impaired citizens to Diplomatic 
Posts: 
 
The second group of judges – because of their different beliefs, opinions, and culture, in 
short their ideological biases – totally contradict the first group which rejected the 
visually impaired citizens'' appointment. They believed that people with disabilities 
should enjoy the same rights side by side with fully-able citizens. Moreover, they added 
that the deprivation of handicapped citizens from holding specific positions because of 
their disabilities represents direct discrimination against them: 
The international agreements and the constitution ban all kinds of 
discrimination against citizens with disabilities. Consequently the 
deprivation from holding specific positions represents extreme 
discrimination against them. All feelings of injustice, oppression and lack 
of affiliation will be entrenched to them.89 
 
 هذهل ةصصخملا ةينازيملا عم بسانتم ريغ نوكي دق ام وهو مهرابتخلا ةصاخ ةنجل ليكشت فيلاكت يف لثمتت ةيدام تاقفنل ةيجراخلا ةرازو
لتل  مهزايتجا  لاح  هنأ  نع  لاضف  اذه  ،ةقباسملا ريفوتب  ةطبترملا  تاقفنلاب  ةمزتلم  لظتس  ةرازولا  نإف  ،نييسامولبدك  مهنييعتو  تارابتخلاا  ك
 ريغ هنأ امك ،بسانتم ريغو ،قهرم دج يدام مازتلا لثمت يهف ،مهتمدخ ةدم ةليط كلذو ،ةيفيظولا مهماهم ءادأ ىلع مهدعاست يتلا تابيترتلا 
لا ةرازو ىلع دوعي نلف ،هءارو نم لئاط لاو يرورض ةيفيظولا مهماهمب مايقلا نوعيطتسي لا نيفوفكم نييسامولبد مادختسا نم عفن ةمث ةيجراخ
.مهدرفمب 
بقب ةمزتلم ريغ رصم نإف مث نمو ، يلصنقلاو يسامولبدلا كلسلا فئاظوب لمعلل رصبلا يدقاف نينطاوملا لوبقل ةبسنلاب  يقوتلا ةمئلام مدع لو
مولبدلا كلسلاب لمعلل نيفوفكملا صاخشلأا هب رمت امو تاقفن نم كلذب طبتري ام ءوض يف كلذو ،يلاحلا  قولا يف لقلأا ىلع يلصنقلاو يسا
  .ةيتاوم ريغ ةيداصتقا فورظ نم دلابلا 
88The original reads:  ،يسامولبدلا كلسلا فئاظوك ةساسحلاو ةماهلا فئاظولا يف نيفوفكملا نييعتزيجت ةيبنجلاا لودلا ضعب  ناك اذا
 سيلف .فادهلأا تاذل لوصولل بردلا سفن يف ريست نأ ىرخلأا لودلا ىلع مازلإب  
- 89Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 5.The original reads:  املو
إف  ،ةقاعلإا  يوذ  صاخشلأا  دض زييمتلا  عاونأ  ةفاك  ترظح ةقاعلإا  يوذ  صاخشلأا   وقح  ةيقافتا   ناك تاجرد  ىصقأ  لثمي  عونلا  اذه  ن
ا رعاشم مهيدل خسري ام وهو ،اهنيعب  ة ف مامأ ةنيعم فئاظوب نييعتلل  يدؤملا بابلا قلغ هنأش نم نأ ذإ  ، افاحجإ  افسعت اهدشأو زييمتلا ملظل
 .ءامتنلاا مدعو داهطضلااو 
 
40 
 
 
Accordingly, this judicial opinion clearly contradicts the previous one; they interpreted 
the notion of discrimination from a distinct perspective. Such interpretation relies mainly 
on their personal thoughts, experiences, and ideologies.  
 
In addition, this opinion refuted the first opinion's argument regarding the absence of 
disabled citizens' medical fitness. It finds that citizens with disabilities still enjoy 
adequate fitness, and they can fulfill specific jobs in the diplomatic arena. Consequently, 
they emphasized that medical fitness has to be assessed within the context of reasonable 
arrangements provided by the Foreign Ministry: 
The facilitating arrangements provide persons with disabilities with the 
required fitness to commit certain diplomatic tasks and jobs. Thus, the 
visually impaired – using a facilitating measure – may hold a position 
in an airline company as one of its staff; nevertheless, it is not 
necessary to work as a pilot whose task is to drive planes. Accordingly, 
the visually impaired can undertake certain technical missions that 
comply with his disabilities and are apart from a task that does not 
comply with his disability.90 
 
Consequently, this point of view believes that the entire prohibition of persons with 
disabilities from diplomatic posts is considered discrimination against them, and it 
contradicts the constitutional principles of equality and equal opportunity among Egyptian 
citizens.   
    
Unlike the first group, judges holding this point of view interpreted the international 
conventions and the Egyptian constitution in a way that serves people with disabilities. 
They believed that the duties and responsibilities of diplomats are likely to encompass 
some managerial positions. Accordingly, they thought that there was no problem to be 
done by the visually impaired  with the appropriate measures provided by the Foreign 
 
90Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note81, at 5.The original reads:  امدنع
ايح ةقاعلإا وذ صخشلا أدبي ةهجلا  هذهب فئاظولا لك لغشل  لاهأ دعي هنأ  ينعي لا كلذ ناف ،نيعم يفيظو رداك ىلع ام ةهجب ةيفيظولا  هت
 اهنم ضرغلا نوكي يتلا ريبادتلا ةفاك ذاختا نم مغرلاب هتقاعإ عم ةتبلا بسانتت لا  ناك نإو ىتح رداكلا كاذو هماهم ءادأ ىلع هتدعاسم
 لمعي نأ يرورضلا نم سيل هنأ لاإ ،ينهملا يفيظولا رداكلاب ناريط ةكرشب لمعلل ريرض صخش قحتلي دق ،لاثملا ليبس ىلعف .ةيفيظولا
لا ىلع هدعاست لا هتاكلمف ،دوشنملا لوصولا ناكم يف اهب طوبهلاو وجلا يف اهتدايقو تارئاطلاب علاقلإا هتمهم نوكتو  ارايط ،ماهملا هذهب مايق
 ةينف  بناوج ىلع اهتابجاو يوطنت ،ةكرشلا  تاذب  ةفيظو لغشي نأ ةلكشم لاف كلذ عمو .ةنواعم ةيريسيت  تابيترت ةمث هتلاحل  روصُتي لاو
 سيتلا ريبادتلاب ةناعتسلااب اهب مايقلا عيطتسيو ،ناريطلاب قلعتت لا اهنكلو ،ةيفيظولا ايازملا تاذب اهللاخ نم عتمتيو ،اضيأ هل اهرفوت يتلا ةيري
 .هلمع ةهج 
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Ministry, such as providing the visually impaired  with assistants to help them in reading 
and writing. In addition, they asserted that if a certain task has to be done by the visually 
impaired diplomat by himself/herself for security reasons, it is possible to use modern, 
adaptive, and technological means to enable him/her to do such a task without assistance, 
such as using a specific scanner to listen to what is included in a certain document.91 
 
This viewpoint rebuts the opposing viewpoint through alleging that the facilitating 
measures that should be provided by the Foreign Ministry must not bear its budget 
unreasonable costs; accordingly, such costs can be easily afforded. Judges holding this 
viewpoint believed that the whole matter in every job promotion initiative will include 
only a few visually impaired citizens; consequently, it is not conceivable for the Ministry 
to pay extra expenses in order to examine them via special committees, or to provide 
them with facilitating means: 
The ministry will not be obliged to provide citizens with disabilities with 
the facilitating arrangements along their serving period. Furthermore, it is 
inaccurate to allege that such arrangements are impractical, expensive, or 
out of the reasonable limits. This is because these arrangements are 
estimated according to every case and responsibilities of each diplomatic 
function separately.92 
 
Those judges strengthened their viewpoint by demonstrating the privileges of the visually 
impaired citizens; they argued that: 
 Losing sight does not mean losing insight, creativity and excellence; 
furthermore, the visually impaired may be a stimulant for a person to 
prove himself and his skills. The visually impaired citizens can enjoy 
 
- 91Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 6.The original reads: 
 موقي نا يف ةلكشم كانه  سيلو يرادلإا عباطلا اهيلع بلغي اهنأ نيبي يلصنقلاو يسامولبدلا كلسلا ءاضعأ تايلو سمو تابجاو ةظحلامبو
أ اهب ىلع اهنمو ،ةروكذملا  ةيقافتلاا ماكحلأ اقفو هل  اهريفوتب  ةيجراخلا  ةرازو مزتلت  يتلا  ريبادتلاب  ةناعتسلااب رصبلا  يدقاف  صاخشلأا دح
عتي ةمهمب رملأا قلعت نإو .ىرخلأا لامعلأا فلتخمب مايقلاو ةباتكلاو ةءارقلا يف يسامولبدلا هب نيعتسي دعاسم فظوم ريفوت لاثملا ليبس ني
 ىلع هنكمت يتلا ةثيدحلا ةيجولونكتلا لئاسولاب نيعتسي نأ ذئدنع نكمملا نمف ،ةيصوصخلاو ةيرسلا تارابتعلا هدرفمب هب مايقلا يسامولبدلا
 ةاكاحملا ايجولونكتب فرعي ام كلذ نمض نمو ،دحأ اهيف هكراشي نأ نود ةمهملا هذهب مايقلا نم(adaptive technology)   عيطتسي اهبو
لا  يسامولبدلا حساملا  ةطساوب  يللآا  بساحلا  زاهج  ىلع  اهليمحت  متي  يتلا  تادنتسملا  هيوحت  ام  لكل  عامتسلاا  ،لاثملا  ليبس  ىلع  ،فيفك
 يئوضلا(scanner) كلذ ريغب لوقلاو ،ةفيظولا هذه يف نييعتلل بولطملا ةيبطلا ةقايللا طرش هدقفي لا هرصبل صخشلا نادقف نإف ،كلذلو  .
قاعا ببسب هدض ازييمت دعي .ةروكذملا ةيقافتلاا ماكحلأ اقفو هت  
 
92Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 6. The original reads:  هنأ امك
  ىحضت فوس ةرازولا  نإف  ،يلصنقلاو  يسامولبدلا  كلسلا  فئاظوب  رصبلا  يدقاف  صاخشلأا نييعت  لاح هنأب  ءاعدلإل  دنس لا ريفوتب  ةمزتلم
 نع جرخت مث نمو ةقهرم فيلاكت ىلع يوطنتو ةيلمع ريغ ريبادت  يهو ،مهتمدخ ةدم ةليط ةيفيظولا  مهماهم ءادأ  نم مهنكمت يتلا  ريبادتلا
 هدح ىلع ةيسامولبد ةفيظو لك تايلو سمل اقفوو ةلاح لك بسحب ردُقت ريبادتلا كلت نلا ،ةيلوقعملا دودح 
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some characteristics which their sighted counterparts don't have, for 
instance the Arabic Literature Dean Taha Hussein who enriched the 
Arabic Library with original literature all over the world. He also held 
several academic and governmental positions, for example as Minister of 
Education.93 
 
Ultimately, those judges concluded their opinion through stating the most essential point 
in their arguments, namely the achievement of democracy and equal opportunity 
principles. They confirmed that the nomination of the visually impaired in diplomatic and 
consular posts reflects how civilized Egyptian authorities. Nations are judged on how 
much they respect their nationals and their major freedoms. Appointing the visually 
impaired to a diplomatic position is a source of pride for Egypt among foreign nations. 
Moreover, it reflects how much Egyptian authorities respect citizens' right to work despite 
disability.94 
 
To sum up, proponents of visually impaired citizens' appointment to diplomatic and 
consular posts believe that they have the right to equal opportunities with their fully-abled 
counterparts. Hence, they should not be deprived entirely from holding these positions in 
a comprehensive manner. In addition, they asserted that it should be taken into account 
that the occupation of certain posts is subject to the discretion of the Foreign Ministry in 
light of the visually impaired 's ability to do what the concerned position might require 
them to do. In other words, the Ministry is obligated to appoint the visually impaired 
citizens to diplomatic posts commensuratewith their abilities after providing the necessary 
facilitating arrangements. 
 
 
93Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note 81, at 7. The original reads:  نادقف
ملا صاخشلأا عتمتي دقف ،  وفتلاو عادبلإاو تاذلا تابثلإ ازفاح نوكي دق هنأ لب ، وفتلاو عادبلااو ةريصبلاب عتمتلا نم عنمي لا رصبلا نيفوفك
لاثم ريخو .نيرصبملا مهنارقأ اهكلتمي لا ايازمب  يتلا لامعلأا نم ديدعلاب ةيبرعلا ةبتكملا ىرثأ يذلا ،نيسح هط يبرعلا بدلأا ديمع كلذ ىلع
.فراعملا ريزو اهنم ناكو ةيموكحلاو ةيميداكلأا بصانملا نم ديدعلا ىلوت هنأ امك ،مملأا رئاس نيب انل ارخف ناكو ىهاضت لا 
94Mahmoud Hassan Ghanem vs. the Foreign Affairs Ministry, supra note81, at 8. The original reads:  نييعت
 رصعلل اهتبكاومو ةيرصملا تاطلسلا رضحت ىدم سكعي نأ هنأش نم يلصنقلاو يسامولبدلا كلسلا فئاظو يف رصبلا يدقاف نينطاوملا
 ف مييُقت لودلا  حضأو يلودلا ينوناقلا ماظنلا جرادم يف ناسنلاا  وقح ئدابم هيف  لع نامز يف اصوصخو ىدم ىلإ رظنلاب فنُصتو هي
 زازتعلااو رخفلل اردصم حبصي نأ يسامولبد ةفيظوب فيفكلا صخشلا نييعت نأش نم نإف ،ةيساسلأا مهتايرحو اهينطاوم  وقحل اهمارتحا
امسلاو لمعلا يف هقحل ةلودلا تاطلس مارتحا ىدم سكعي هنابسحب ،مهيدل اهليثمتب موقي يتلا ىرخلأا نادلبلا رئاس نيب رصمل اذه دلقتب هل ح
   .رصبلل هنادقف نم مغرلاب ساسحلاو ماهلا بصنملا 
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C. The Advisory Opinion of the General Assembly for the advisory and 
Legislation Departments Regarding Visually impaired citizens:95 
 
Because of such controversial judicial opinions regarding the visually impaired 
appointment to diplomatic and consulate posts, the issue was presented to the General 
Assembly's Advisory and Legislation Departments in the Egyptian State Council for its 
legal opinion.96 The General Assembly supported the viewpoint of the first group on the 
grounds that the medical and health fitness levels needed to comply with the requirements 
of the job that are set by law. Consequently, the General Assembly concluded that the 
visually impaired do not meet the required fitness levels for diplomatic posts. The 
General Assembly highlighted the reasons: 
           Missions of diplomatic posts, include mainly the corresponding means 
usage in various types especially encrypted messaging, beside the ability 
of an effective contact with foreign countries representatives. This 
communication imposes the diplomat to detect the impressions and 
excitements of other countries representatives and their behavior to be 
conveyed to his own country officials.  These affairs are appreciated in 
nation's relations, as these tasks are supposed to have several individual 
meetings with counterparts some of them are secret. Furthermore, 
missions of documentation, attending conferences and accompanying 
the participating delegations need sense of sight, as the person in charge 
should do it solitary without assistantship.97 
 
Comparison and Analysis: 
Despite the fact that each judicial stream relies mainly on the same legal provisions, 
namely the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the 
 
95The General Assembly for the advisory and Legislation departments at the State Council (2013).  
The General Assembly is considered the competent entity that adjudicates the debatable matters between 
diverse advisory departments. The Original reads:   ةلودلا  سلجمب  عيرشتلاو  يوتفلا  يمسقل  ةيمومعلا  ةيعمجلا
 يرصملا 
96File no.1139/3/86 – session 9/10/2013   
97The General Assembly, supra note 95.The original reads:  نمضتت يسامولبدلا كلسلا ءاضعأب ةطونملا ماهملا  ناك املو
 لودلا  يلثمم  عم  لاعفلا  لصاوتلا  ىلع  ةردقلا  ىلإ  ةفاضلإاب  اهنم  ةرفشملا  ةصاخ  اهعاونأ  فلتخمب  ةلسارملا  لئاسو  مادختسا  يساسأ  لكشب
 ةقيرطو ىرخلأا لودلا يلثمم نم مهب يقتلي نم تلااعفناو تاريبعتل هتاذب يسامولبدلا نيبت نم لصاوتلا اذه هضرفي امب ،ةيبنجلأا عضومو
 نم لمعلا اذه هضرتفي امع  لاضف لودلا تاقلاع يف ريدقت لحم رومأ اهلك يهو اهيلإ يمتني يتلا ةلودلاب نيلو سملا ىلإ كلذ لقنل مهسولج ددعت
ابتعا نم اهفلغي امل دعاسم نود هريظن عم  ادرفنم اهيف يسامولبدلا نوكي نأ لاإ لاحب نكمي لا يتلاو هئارظن عم ةيدرفلا تاءاقللا ةيرسلا تار
 ةرشابمو  ةيليثمتلا  تاثعبلا  صاصتخا  ةرئاد  يف  نيدوجوملا  نييرصملا  نينطاوملا  ةيامحو  ةدعاسم  ماهمب  يسامولبدلا  علاطضا  نع   لاضف
فت اهلك رومأ يهو ةكراشملا دوفولا ةقفارمو تارمتؤملا روضحو قيثوتلا اهنيب نم يتلاو ةيليثمتلا تاثعبلا اهب فلكملا ةيلصنقلا لامعلأارت ض
 ةقايللا  طرش رفوت  نود  ءادتبا  لوحي  رصبلا  دقف  نإف  مدقت  ام  ىلع ابيترتو  .ةدعاسم نود  هدرفمب  اهب  همايقو  رصبلا  ةمعنب  اهب  موقي  نم  عتمت 
يجراخلا ةرازو هدقعت يذلا ةقباسملا ناحتما يف هتلاح ةضورعملا  اروأ لوبق زوجي لا مث نمو ،ةفيظولا هذه لغشل  انوناق بلطتملا ةيحصلا ة
ل‘‘.يسامولبد قحلم ةفيظو يف نييعتل  
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Egyptian constitution and laws, they reached distinctly different conclusions. I think that 
each group believes in certain ideas, and wants to reach a conclusion that complies with 
such ideas. These ideas may be derived mainly from the judge's ideologies, personal 
thoughts, experiences, and education.  
 
I think that the opponents of the visually impaired citizens appointment to diplomatic and 
consular posts adopt certain ideas that are not as democratic, civilized, and open minded 
as the second group. Despite the fact that such a stream pretends to manifest their 
rejection to appoint visually impaired as diplomat on a practical and pragmatic basis, for 
example the expensiveness and cost of the facilitating measures provided by the Ministry 
and the absence of the required fitness level, I believe that such arguments are not the 
principle ones. The major reason for their refusal is their personal attitude towards 
disabled people. I do not question their belief in the right to work of people with 
disabilities, such as the visually impaired; however, this right is limited to certain 
professions. Such an opinion finds that the right to work for these people cannot be 
extended to certain posts, namely the "sovereign" ones, even if such disabled people are 
qualified to fulfill the professional requirements. According to such a view the exclusion 
of visually impaired citizens from the diplomatic and consulate fields does not entail 
discrimination against them. 
 
I think such a point of view is widely adopted in Egyptian society; it is a common notion 
in Egyptian culture because of our education, exposure, vision and attitude regarding the 
disabled as a whole and visually impaired in particular. Accordingly, we cannot find a 
visually impaired  judge, a military officer or even a police officer who is visually 
impaired  even if his qualifications and capabilities are enough to qualify him to work for 
these sovereign entities. I am not arguing that he may be appointed as an officer whose 
task is to pursue criminal in the street; rather the administration is bound to find a suitable 
and appropriate post that complies with his competences. 
 
On the other hand proponents of visually impaired appointment to diplomatic 
positionsunderstand the same legal provisions from a different viewpoint; they handled 
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this matter from a distinct legal viewpoint. They believe that visually impaired citizens 
have the right to be appointed to every place and profession that complies with their 
abilities and capacities. Moreover, they think that the exemption of visually impaired 
from special posts contradicts international conventions and the Egyptian provisions of 
equality, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination. Accordingly, judges in this judicial 
stream differ mainly from the first one; they interpret international conventions and the 
constitution in a way that serves people with disabilities. Furthermore, they try hard to 
balance disabled people's human rights which involve their rights to work and to be equal 
to able-bodied people on the one side and their capabilities on the other.  
 
I believe that such massive conflict in State Council jurisprudence regarding these two 
positions can be comprehended in light of their distinct education, culture, and personal 
formation and thoughts. This is the rational interpretation that may clarify the significant 
mental differentiation between judges to comprehend certain subjects, despite the fact that 
such a subject is governed by certain, specific, and fixed legal provisions.  
 
 
46 
 
 
V. Appointment of Women to Public Service 
 
According to successive Egyptian constitutions women are equal to men in their rights and 
responsibilities.98 Nevertheless, the issue of appointing women to public servant positions 
including as judges in Egypt has been a controversial issue for many years. Despite the fact 
that the Egyptian Constitution and laws guarantee equality between men and women in 
almost all fields of life, such an issue is contested in State Council case law.  Some cases 
support women serving as public servants and judges, whereas others strongly reject this 
notion.  I shall demonstrate firstly the appointment of women to public posts then in the 
judicial ones. 
A. Appointing Women to Public Posts:Fawzia Michael Hanna v. Minister of Health99 and 
Mona Taher v. Minister of Health:100 
There are two cases that reflect the two main judicial viewpoints regarding public service 
appointment. 
1. Proponents of Women Appointment to Public Posts: 
The facts of the above two cases Fawzia Michael Hanna v. Minister of Health and Mona 
Taher v. Minister of Health are almost the same. Both plaintiffs held Bachelor degrees of 
science from Cairo University and then applied to the Health Ministry for appointment as 
chemists in its laboratories. Both of them succeeded in the Ministry exams, and signed all of 
the required official papers in order to be hired; however, the Ministry rejected their 
appointment in spite of their successful applications. Consequently, each plaintiff filed a 
lawsuit against the Ministry of Health before the Judicial Administrative Court.101 The 
plaintiffs alleged that in spite of fulfilling all of the required conditions for the concerned 
posts, the Ministry still rejected their appointment. The court decided on 29/6/1960 in Fawzia 
Michael Hanna v. Minister of Health and on 28/12/1960 in Mona Taher v. Minister of Health 
that they deserve compensation for being dismissed as chemists in the Ministry laboratories: 
 
98 Several Constitutions have equalized between women and men, such as Egyptian 1923, 1930, 1956, 
1971, 2014 constitutions. 
99Fawzia Michael Hanna v. the Minister of Health.1 (1960). 
100 Mona Taher v. the Minister of Health.1 (1960). 
101Fawzia Michaelpursued the suit no. 1137 for the judicial year 13, whereas Mona Taher pursued the 
lawsuit no. 395 for the judicial law 14. 
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The Ministry of health has to compensate the plaintiff because of two main 
reasons; firstly, the competition announcement does not involve any legal 
condition that stipulates the appointment has to be for men only. Secondly, 
the plaintiff fulfilled all the legal conditions and the medical examinations 
that are required for the post; consequently, she has to be appointed without 
any restrictions and obstacles.102 
 
2. Opponents of Women Appointment to Public Posts: 
The Ministry of Health appealed the above two verdicts before the Supreme Administrative 
Court as a second degree court.103 The Supreme Court abolished the first degree judgments 
and reached a different conclusion based on a distinct interpretation of the constitutional 
provisions of equality and equal opportunity among Egyptian citizens. The court decided on 
21/3/1963 for Fawzia Michael Hanna v. Minister of Health and on 28/2/1965 for Mona 
Taher v. Minister of Health to reject their appointment as public servants on the basis that 
they were not discriminated against rather it was a question of ministry discretion:   
It is not a breach of legitimacy or equality concepts, if the plaintiff is not 
appointed as a chemist in the Ministry laboratories. Not only do the 
excellence and efficiency criteria qualify the applicant for the concerned 
post, but also there is another criterion which is the administration's 
discretionary power in the light of the applicant's marital status, gender, 
environmental conditions, tradition and custom.104 
 
Accordingly, the Court recognized the notions of custom and tradition as essential criteria in 
the public post appointment. It considered that such legal viewpoint complies with the 
Constitution and the existing laws as its main goal is public interest and the common good:  
 
 The administration has the right to assess the validity of an applicant woman 
to fulfill the conditions of a certain public profession in light of some 
environmental factors, traditions, social customs, and the nature and 
responsibilities of the post itself in order to achieve the public interest and 
 
102Fawzia Michael Hanna v. the Minister of Health, supra note99 at 2.The original reads:   ضيوعتب  ةمكحملا   ضق
ك  ةفيظوب  لمعلاب   احتللاا  ةبلاط  ةيعدملا ةفيظولا  يلوتل  ثانلاا  ةيحلاص مدع  طرش نم   لخ  ةقباسملا  طورش لاوا  ببسب  لماعملا  ةحلصمب  يئايمي
 قئاع ريغب نييعتلل ةزهاج  حبصا مث نمو يبطلا نويسموقلا يف  حجنو اهنييعت تاغوسم  مدقو  حجن ةيعدملا نا يلا ةفاضلااب .اهنع نلعملا ،
وتسي ةرادلاا نم أطخ اهنييعت مدع ناف كلذو.ضيوعتلا بج  
 
103The suit no. 1137 for the judicial year 13 was appealed by the appeal no. 2536 for the judicial year 6, 
whereas the suit no. 395 for the judicial year 14 was appealed by the appeal no. 898 for the judicial year7. 
104The Minister of Health v. Mona Taher.2 (1963). The original reads " بيترت يف اهيلي نم نييعتو ةيعدملا نييعت مدع درجم
عملا  وه  سيل  ةءافكلاو   وفتلا  نلا ،  ةاواسملا  أدبمو  ةيعورشملاب  للاخا  يلع  يوطني  لا  لماعملا  ةحلصمب  يئايميكك  لمعلا  ةقباسم  يف  حاجنلا راي
 كانه امناو ةماعلا ةفيظولل لهؤملا ديحولا .فرعلا ماكحاو ة يبلا فورظو سنجلاو ةيعامتجلاا ةلاحلا لثم ةرادلاا اهردقت يرخا ريياعم  
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the common good. The court asserted that such conception does not 
contradict with the constitutional principles of equality and equal opportunity 
among citizens in Egyptian society.105 
 
Moreover, the Court tried to rationalize its legal viewpoint by focusing on the conception of 
women's comfort and relief. Accordingly, the Court contended that the nature of the post that 
the plaintiff sought may exhaust her as such posts necessitate the continuous and 
considerable travel from one place to another. This may force the plaintiff for example to ride 
livestock on bumpy roads, or towalk on foot for long distances, or even to accompany taxi 
drivers alone. Consequently, the Court concluded that such risks and hardship, if imposedon 
a woman violates the appropriate conditions that should be provided for women in public 
posts. Accordingly, if the administration limited such kinds of jobs to men, this is due to their 
capability to bear the hardship and burden.106 
 
Ultimately, the Court tried hardly to convince its legal audience of its judicial viewpoint, and 
it depended on more than one argument for such mission. I strongly believe that the massive 
differentiation in the previous viewpoints is related to judges' different ideologies and 
experiences.  
 
B. Appointing Women to Judicial Posts: 
 
Not only have some courts rejected the appointment of women to public posts, but also there are 
other courts that have dismissed women appointed as judges in judicial entities in Egypt. 
 
1. Proponents for Traditions and Customs notions as Criteria for Women Appointment 
to Judicial Posts: FawziaAbdElSattar v. Minister of Justice and AmenaMostafa v. 
Minister of Justice: 
 
 
105The Minister of Health v. Fawzia Michael Hanna. 3 (1960). The original reads:  يلع صني روتسدلا ناك اذاو
 يف ةرادلاا قح نع اريثك فلتخي كلذ ناف ، ةماعلا  وقحلا يف ةاواسملا لماوعل اقفو ةماعلا فئاظولا ضعب ماهمب مايقلل ةأرملا ةيحلاص ريدقت
.اهنم صاقتنلاا وا اهنأش راقتحاب قلعتي لا رملااو .ماعلا حلاصلل اقيقحت اهتايلؤسمو ةفيظولا ةعيبطو فرعلاو ديلاقتلا ماكحاو ة يبلا 
106The Minister of Health v. Mona Taher, supra note104 at 4. The original reads:  لماعملا ةحلصمب ةيعدملا اهيلا يعست يتلا ةفيظولا
 ءارجلا رخلا عقوم نم لاقتنلاا ةرثك بلطتت ةفيظولا هذه ةعيبط ناو ، ديعصلا يفو ةرهاقلا جراخ ةيئانلا يرقلاب بلاغلا يف اهزكارم عقت امب ، ةمزلالا ليلاحتلا
ا  وا  ،  ةرعو  كلاسم  يف  باودلل  فظوملا  للاقتسا  بجوتسي ةقشملا  هذه  ناف  كلذلو  .هدرفمب  ةرجلاا  يقئاس  ةقفارم  وا  ،  ةليوط  تافاسمل  مادقلاا  يلع  ريسل
 رصقت ةرادلاا ةهج ناف كلذلو .ةماعلا ةفيظولا يف ةأرملل اهريفوت بجي يتلا ةمئلاملا فورظلا عم  ضراعت ةأرملا يلع  ضرف اذا رطاخملاو فئاظولا هذه
شمو اهئابعا لمحت يلع ردقلاا لاجرلل.اهتاق  
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The above two cases Fawzia Abd El Sattar v. Minister of Justice and Amena Mostafa v. Minister 
of Justice relate to the appointment of women to judicial posts. The plaintiffs in both cases held 
Bachelor degrees in law, and applied for appointment in the judicial posts. The first one applied to 
be a judge in the Egyptian State Council, whereas the second plaintiff aimed to be a lawyer in the 
Governmental Cases Department.107In spite of fulfilling the requirements set for these professions, 
the Minister of Justice rejected their appointment to the judicial posts; consequently, each one 
filed a lawsuit against the Ministry of Justice in protest.108 
 
Both first and second degree courts refused to appoint them on the same basis as shown before, 
namely customs and traditions in the Egyptian society which restrict their appointment:  
Women may not be entirely prohibited from being appointed as judges or members 
in the judicial bodies, otherwise viewpoint shall actually violate the constitutional 
conceptions of equality and equal opportunities between people in the Egyptian 
society.109 
 
Despite the fact that the court prohibited an entire ban of women appointment as judges, it 
introduced a serious exception. The Court asserted that the Ministry has the discretionary 
power to determine the appropriateness and convenience of its decision; it has the power to 
set the appropriatetime for women to hold public posts, such as judicial ones. Such power is 
granted to the Ministry without any judicial supervision as long as its main goal is to achieve 
public interest and the common good. Accordingly, the Court contended that if the Ministry 
decided to exclude the plaintiff from judicial posts because of the inappropriate time for the 
appointment, the Ministry did not violate the Egyptian Constitution as long as such a ban is 
temporary. The Ministry has to undertake such power in light of the environmental 
conditions, customs and traditions, social considerations, and the nature of every post. 
 
107The Arabic translation shall be " اقباس ةموكحلا اياضق ملق وا ةلودلا اياضق ة يه 
108The first plaintiff pursued the suit no. 30 for the judicial year 4 before the Administrative Judicial Court whish 
issued its judgment on 2/2/1952, and it was appealed before the Supreme Administrative Court by the appeal no. 243 
for the judicial year 6 and the judicial verdict was issued on 22/12/1953.  
The second plaintiff filed the lawsuit no. 33 for the judicial year 4 before the Supreme Administrative court which 
issued its judgment on 20/2/1952. 
109
FawziaAbdElSattar v. the Minister of Justice. 2 (1952). The original reads:  تابجاولاو  وقحلا يف لجرلاب ةأرملا ةاواسم يضتقم
 كلذ ناك لااو لامعلااو فئاظولا هذه يلوت نم قلطم هجو يلع اهنامرح زاوج مدع وه فئاظولل ةبسنلاب امك .ةاواسملا أدبمل افلاخم ةفصب ةأرملا نامرح زوجي لا
.ةيئاضقلا تا يهلاوا ءاضقلا بصنم يلوتل نامز لك يفو ةقلطم 
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Moreover, the Court added that such conception is totally apart from women contempt or 
detraction in her society.110 
 
Accordingly, the Court considered some criteria, such as customs and traditions to determine 
the appropriate time for appointment. Not only did the Court set the notion of "the 
appropriate time" as an exception, but also it determined a new exception for women's 
appointment as judges. The Court decided that the woman applicant has to be "developed and 
valid enough" in order to hold a specific profession: 
 
The Ministry shall have the discretionary power to determine whether or not 
a woman has been improved and developed enough in order to be 
appropriate for a certain post. Accordingly, the Ministry is obliged to 
equalize between a man and a woman if such woman fulfills all the validity 
reasons to be appointed in the concerned post.111 
 
Thus, it is obvious that the court relied mainly on subjective criteria for women's appointment 
in judicial bodies. Such criteria varies from one judge to another according to each judge's 
experience, personal knowledge, environment, and ideologies.   
 
2. Opponents for Traditions and Customs notions as Criteria for Women Appointment 
to Judicial Posts: Hanem Mohamed Hasan v. Minister of Justice: 
 
The court in Hanem Mohamed Hasan v. Minister of Justiceadopted a distinct legal 
viewpoint; it did not consider custom and tradition as criteria for women's appointment to 
judicial posts. 
 
The plaintiff in this case held a Bachelor's degree in law, and applied for appointment as a 
judge at the State Council. In spite of fulfilling the requirements set for such a position as in 
 
110AmenaMostafa v. the Minister of Justice. 2 (1952). The original reads:   .اهتارارق  رادصا ةمئلام ةطلسب  ةرادلاا  عتمتت
يدم فسعت ريغ نم ردقت نا ةرادلال  ةرادلال ةصخر يهف ،ءاضقلاب لمعلاك ةماعلا فئاظولاو بصانملا ضعب ةأرملا هيف يلوتت يذلا  قولا ةمئلام
 لاو ، اهتاسبلامو ةفيظو لك لاوحاو ةيعامتجلاا تارابتعلااو فرعلاو ديلاقتلاو ة يبلا فورظب كلذ يف ةيدهتسم ةيريدقتلا اهتطلس يضتقمب بقعم
ا   غتبا  املاط ءاضقلا  نم  اهيلع فلاخي  لا  ةفيظولا  هذه اهيلوتل  دعب  نحي  مل   قولا  نا  ةجحب  ةيئاضق ةفيظو يف  ةيعدملا  نييعت  مدع .ماعلا  حلاصل
 .يملعلا وا يفاقثلا وا يبدلاا اهاوتسم وا اهتمارك وا ةأرملا ةناكم نم اصاقتنا كلذ دعي لا ةأرملا نييعت مدع .روتسدلا 
111FawziaAbdElSattar v. the Minister of Justice, supra note109 at 5. The original reads:  ةطلسلا ةرادلال كرتي نا بجي
 دح يلا تروطت دق ددحم بصنم وا ةفيظول ةبسنلاب ةأرملا  ناك اذا ام ديدحتل ةيريدقتلاةيحلاصلا  نا ةرادلاا تأر ناف ، ةفيظولا وا بصنملا اذه لغشل
.بصنملا وا ةفيظولا كلتل ةبسنلاب لجرلاب اهيواست نا اهيلع ناك ةيحلاصلا بابسا  فوتسا ةأرملا 
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the other cases, the Minister rejected the appointment; consequently, she filed a lawsuit 
against the Ministry of Justice in protest.112Despite the fact that the Court reached the same 
conclusion as the previous judgments, its legal verdict contradictedentirely the previous ones. 
The court confirmed that the Ministry regularly excluded women from judicial posts because 
of two main reasons. The first one relates to the Egyptian social customs and traditions which 
involve the conception of inferiority; women are lower than men due to their physical 
formation or because they may be underdeveloped if they are compared to men. Secondly, 
the mistaken comprehension of the Islamic Shari'athat women are forbidden from being 
judges.113 
 
The court decided to discard the notion of custom and traditions as the main criteria for 
appointment to judicial posts. The court emphasized that women can hold public office: 
 
The role of custom and traditions in Egyptian society has been developed in 
a way that admits women to hold public office. Accordingly, it shall not be 
admissible anymore to exclude women from public posts and judicial 
professions because of custom and traditions, tough environmental 
conditions, or even some posts special stipulations.114 
 
Despite the fact that the court reached the same conclusion as the previous judgments, it did 
not rely on traditions to exclude the plaintiff.The court used the argument of Islamic Shari'a 
to dismiss the plaintiff from being appointed as a judge:  
 
             Because of the fact that the appointment of women as judges is a 
controversial issue in Islamic Shari'a, the Ministry is totally free to adopt one 
of the two contradicting opinions as long as it is aiming at achieving the 
 
112The suit no. 316 for the judicial year 20 before the Supreme Administrative Court, and the judgment was issued 
in 2/6/1979. 
113Hanem Mohamed Hasan v. the Minister of Justice. 2 (1979). The original reads:   ةهجلا  اهيلع   نب  يتلا  رصانعلا
وجوملا  اهلوصا  يلا  تدر  ام  اذا  ءاضقلا  بصنم  يف  ةيعدملا  نييعت  ةمئلام  مدعب  اهريدقت  ةيرادلاا نيلصا  يف  دسجتت  اهناف  ةيرصملا  ة يبلا  يف  ةد
مهلوا  نييساسا اهنيوكت ةعيبط ببسب ءاوس لجرلا  نم انأش لقاو يوتسم يندا  اهنا  يلع ةأرملا  يلا  مدقلا  ذنم عمتجملا  ةرظن يف لثمتملا  فرعلا  :ا
قت  زيجت  لا  اهنا  يلع  ةيملاسلاا  ةعيرشلا  ماكحلا عئاشلا  مهفلا  امهيناثو  ،  ةفاقثلاو  ملعلا  جرادم  يف  لجرلا  نع  اهفلخت  ببسب  وا  ،  يقلخلا ةأرملا  ديل
ولا ."ءاضقلا ةيلاو اهنمو اهنم  لاطا يلع ةماعلا تايلا  
114Id., at 4.The original reads:  دلقت يف ةأرملا قحب فارتعلأا لاجم يف تروطت دق يرصملا عمتجملا يف فرعلا دعاوق نا ةمكحملا دكؤت
 لا فورظو ديلاقتلاو فرعلا يلا دانتسلاا كلذ دعب هعم غوسي لا امب ةماعلا فئاظولاو بصانملا بصنم دلقت نم ةأرملا نامرحل فئاظولا لاوحأو ة يب
 .ءاضقلا 
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public good.115 Accordingly, the Ministry is right to rely on the religious 
opinion that bans women from holding judicial posts.116 
 
3. The Egyptian State Council General Assembly opinion:117 
The notion of prohibiting women from being appointed as judges has been continued from 
the 1960suntil now. Accordingly, the General Assembly of the State Council118 decided in 
2010 with almost total consensus to defer the appointment of women as judges in the 
Council. The judges argued that the dismissal of women is due to several reasons, such as the 
seriousness and importance of the issue which necessitates more time to be studied well. 
Moreover, the judges argued that such a deferral may take place due to the lack of safe and 
secure places for women to stay when presiding over a trial and the lack of nurseries for their 
children. I totally believe that the actual reason for such a rejection is judges' own beliefs and 
ideologies regarding women's appointment as judges. These conceptions are strongly related 
to customs and traditions in the Egyptian society.     
 
C. Comparison and Analysis: 
Despite the fact that each judicial opinion relied on the same legal provisions, for instance the 
International Declaration of Human Rights and the successive Egyptian constitutions119 
which provided for the equality of citizens before the law in their rights and duties, they 
reached different conclusions.     
 
The legal viewpoint which granted the Ministry wide discretionary power concerning the 
appointment of women to public and judicial posts depended on subjective criteria, for 
instance customs, traditions, social circumstances, the appropriate time for appointment, and 
 
115It is worth mentioning that Islamic Shari'a involves two contradicting religious viewpoints; the first one 
admits women to hold judicial posts, whereas the second one bans such concept. 
116
Hanem Mohamed Hasan v. the Minister of Justice, supra note 113 at 5.The original reads:  يلا ةمكحملا  هتنا
رادلاا ةهج ناو ضراعمو ديؤم نيب ةيملاسلاا ةعيرشلا يف ةيفلاخلا روملاا نم وه ءاضقلا ةفيظوب ةأرملا نييعت عوضوم نا معزب يوعدلا ضفر ة
 رظنلا ةهجو ينبت يف قحلا اهل.يرخلاا نود ةضراعملا  
 
117The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights, Brocken Justice in Egypt (Dec.2010),  available at 
http://ecwronline.org/?p=1187 
118The General Assembly of the State Council is composed of all chancellors and judges of the State 
Council who have the right to vote in its decisions.  
119 The Egyptian constitutions starting from 1923, then 1930, 1952, 1971, 2011, 2014 and their amendments 
provided for the equality of citizens before the law in their rights and duties.  
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the improvement and development of women. These criteria depend mainly on the judge's 
social thoughts, education, and environment; accordingly, it may differ from one judge to 
another and from one time to another.  
 
Despite the fact that some of these verdicts were issued over sixty years ago, this study 
compares these legal judgments in relatively close proximity in time in order to demonstrate 
the subjective intervention of judges in their decisions. Thus, both cases which relate to 
women's appointment to public posts took place in the 1960s. In addition, the other two 
judgments that excluded women from being appointed to judicial posts because of traditions 
and customs criteria took place in the 1950s, whereas the verdict that contradicted with such 
viewpoint was issued in the 1970s. It is irrational to argue that the main reason for the change 
in the court's viewpoint is the time factor, namely the ten years between the two 
judgments.120 This is because in 2010 the State Council General Assembly readopted the 
former legal opinion which relied on custom and tradition as main criteria for women's 
appointment. Accordingly, the main reason for the change in the legal position between 
judges is the distinction between them in their personal experience, thoughts, beliefs, 
conceptions, ideologies, education, and environment. 
 
Regarding women who applied for appointment as chemists in the Health Ministry 
laboratories, the first degree court applied the exact rules that were stipulated in the 
constitution and laws, namely the efficiency criterion; consequently, the court adjudicated to 
assign them to such posts. The court excluded customs and traditions by stating that the 
plaintiff had to be appointed as long as she fulfilled the required legal and medical 
stipulations. Whereas the second degree judges, because of their own beliefs regarding 
women, placed heavier weight on the existing customs and traditions. Moreover, they tried 
hard to promote the idea that the verdict was in favor of the plaintiff particularly, and women 
 
120 Accordingly, some may allege that the main reason for the massive change in the legal viewpoints 
regarding custom and tradition is the time criterion. They may argue that judges who issued the judgment in 
1979 were mentally developed enough if they were compared with their counterpart in the sixties; 
consequently, they ignore the criteria of custom and traditions as main reasons for appointment. I strongly 
believe that such viewpoint is inaccurate because the notions of traditions and custom are still adopted till 
nowadays; accordingly, it is not a matter of time development. I think the General Assembly of judges that 
took place in 2010 and readopted the conception of traditions is a strong evident for the correctness of my 
viewpoint; it is a matter of judges' differentiation in their ideologies and personal experience.     
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in general, by protecting them from the surrounding environment. Consequently, the court 
alleged that customs and traditions aimed at protecting the working women from hardship 
and fatigue.  They tried hard to demonstrate that their judgment was derived through the pure 
application of law and logical deduction of the facts before them.  
 
Furthermore, the appointment of women to judicial posts in these cases encompassed some 
subjective criteria too. Some judges relied on the same notion of customs and traditions as 
criteria for holding judicial posts. The court, in these cases, added some additional 
conditions, such as the appropriate time for women to be hired and the validity and their 
credentials to hold certain positions.  
 
The negative impact of such criteria is that the conception and comprehension of customs 
and traditions differ substantially from one judge to another. For instance a judge who was 
born and brought up in the city might have a distinct point of view regarding customs and 
traditions if compared to his counterpart from rural areas. In addition, such standards vary 
from one period to another; consequently, the verdicts that were issued in the 1950s relied on 
customs and traditions as criteria to hold judicial posts; such thinking involved the idea that 
women were lesser developed than men.121 On the contrary, in the 1970s the court explicitly 
dismissed the notion of traditions; however, in 2010 Egyptian State Council judges implicitly 
readopted customs and traditions as the main criteria for holding judicial posts.122 These 
traditions involve the conception that it is not the appropriate time for women to serve as 
judges in the State Council.123 
 
Ultimately, I do not question the accuracy of the verdicts; rather I want to highlight the 
differentiation in judgments due to some judges' subjective viewpoints.124 In addition, I want 
 
121 I am arguing that the Egyptian mentality as a whole adopted and still adopts the notion of masculine. 
Such social ideas may reach the judicial verdicts and opinions in many places. 
122It is worth mentioning that the State Council judges did not explicitly reject women from being appointed 
as judges because of custom and traditions; rather they preferred to say that such issue needs some time in 
order to be studied well.  
123 Of course, I am not aiming in this study at contradicting the State Council judges' viewpoints regarding 
the appointment of women in their courts because I am one of them; rather I am trying to    a certain matter 
which is the judges' psychological effects on the cases that they are adjudicating. 
124 I want to assert that such viewpoints of judges are not intentional at all; rather they may be part of 
judges' personalities. 
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to emphasize the point that if some courts explicitly recognize the criteria of custom and 
traditions for the appointment of women in public posts generally and judicial professions 
particularly, such customs, traditions, and environmental conditions are absolutely assessed 
in the light of the judges' education, environment, ideologies, beliefs, perceptions, and 
thoughts. 
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 Conclusion 
Judges are human beings who are impacted by their environment; accordingly, they are 
affected by their education and experiences, and by the prevailing norms of their society. 
Such factors and effects are reflected in their legal judgments. Consequently, judges' work 
cannot be described as the mere application of law because such a description is not accurate.  
 
A judge legislates according to his own particular interpretation of a certain legal provision in 
a manner that may broaden or narrow its scope of application in order to achieve justice from 
his personal point of view. This process is a mental activity which depends substantially on 
the way a judge comprehends a rule of law. Such comprehension differs from one judge to 
another according to education, personal thoughts, experiences, environment, and ideologies; 
this is what is called "judicial activism." Judicial activisms are these personal ideas and 
principles which judges may include in their legal decisions unintentionally because of their 
ideological biases.  
 
This study highlights judicial policies that are seen in several human rights cases in Egyptian 
State Council jurisprudence. Judges differ in their comprehension and interpretation of many 
notions and conceptions, for instance of what constitutes public order, personal freedom, 
discrimination, and customs and traditions in Egyptian society. The study does not question 
the accuracy of the presented case study verdicts; rather it highlights differences among 
judgments due to judges' subjective viewpoints. 
 
Because of the fact that judges legislate in many cases, their legal decisions in these cases 
might not be legally anticipated; consequently, this may lead to contradictory judgments. The 
multiplicity of the contradictory judgments in Egyptian society because of this judicial 
activism may introduce uncertainty in the legal judgments among Egyptians which may lead 
to negative consequences. Accordingly, judges have to present every controversial and 
contradictory issue to the Unifying Circuit in the Supreme Administrative Court in order to 
unify the diverse viewpoints. In addition, they have to respect, apply, adhere to, and comply 
with such Circuit’s legal decisions in order to avoid or reduce the notion of contradictory 
judgments in Egypt.            
